


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
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



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LETTERS WRITTEN
FROM ENGLAND
AUGUST 4 TO NOVEMBER 4, 1914

LETTERS WRITTEN
FROM ENGLAND
TO THE UNITED STATES





“LETTERS WRITTEN
FROM ENGLAND”

AUGUST 4 TO NOVEMBER 4, 1914

BY
ARTHUR CROSBY LUDINGTON

NEW YORK

1915

LETTERS WRITTEN

FROM ENGLAND


TO THE EDITOR OF THE

NEW YORK TIMES

ON THE 10th OF

APRIL 1985

RE: THE NEW YORK TIMES



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FOREWORD

ARTHUR CROSBY LUDINGTON was the son of Charles Henry and Josephine Noyes Ludington and was born in New York City on March 6th, 1880. His preparation for college was received at the Black Hall (Connecticut) School, and at St. Paul's School, Concord, New Hampshire. After graduating with honors from Yale University, he was connected for nearly three years with a banking firm in New York City, and then went to Princeton as instructor in Political Science and assistant to President Woodrow Wilson. In the summer of 1907 he went to Germany and studied at Heidelberg University, and later took courses at Columbia. At this time he identified himself with political reform work in New York and gave especial attention to the betterment of election laws, helping to frame the direct nominations and Massachusetts ballot bills which are now laws of New York State. He served for several years as a member of the Legislative Committee of the Citizens' Union of New York City and was active in the National Short Ballot Association. Among other things, he made a compilation of the variations in the forms of the ballot, from the days of the "vest pocket" variety to the present Australian and composite forms. Before his last trip abroad, he was attached for a time to the Department of the Interior at Washington, writing a report on the Indian policy of the United States Government.

In November, 1913, because of ill health, he went to


England, intending, if he had not recovered after a winter there, to take a trip around the world. At the outbreak of hostilities, this trip was abandoned, and he remained in England and devoted himself to a study of the war. As his health returned, he became anxious to help in some active way and volunteered for the English army. Finding that he must give up his American citizenship in order to be accepted, he turned to the Red Cross, and was going to France to work in connection with the Australian Volunteer Hospital in Boulogne, when his death occurred, on November 4th, following the accidental discharge of his revolver.

The following letters were written from August 4th to November 4th, when he was living at Cromer and Sheringham on the Norfolk coast. Although done hastily and with no thought of publication, they give his first attempts to shape an opinion from events as they occurred and from wide reading on the questions involved. The occasionally didactic tone was in response to an appeal for information from the sister to whom many of them were sent. Living quietly in the country where he saw only the English papers and periodicals and a belated "New York Times," he knew little of what Americans were thinking and saying, and did not realize how copiously the war was being discussed on this side of the water; so he was unconscious of covering familiar ground. But, even so, his friends will be interested in the letters because they are his, and because while they were written during the early months of the struggle, their subject matter is not out of date, and his general position is supported by later developments.


Because of the pressure of unfamiliar questions which the suddenness of the outbreak occasioned, the early letters deal more with facts than with underlying principles; but

as time went on, his mind was turning from the immediate causes to the deeper issues of the conflict.

Purely personal and irrelevant matters have been omitted and the sections where he covered the same ground in writing to different people are condensed, except where the reiteration of certain ideas shows what aspects of the subject were most on his mind.



LETTERS WRITTEN FROM
ENGLAND



LETTERS WRITTEN FROM ENGLAND

North Cromer, August 4, 1914.

Dear K.:

Your cables of Saturday and yesterday reached me here, where I have been staying for the past two weeks. Of course, I am disappointed—terribly disappointed—that you are n't coming, but I must say that I think you are right in giving up the trip under the circumstances. With four great nations already at war and the possibility very strong, in view of Sir Edward Grey's speech in the House last night, that England will be drawn in in a day or two by Germany's wanton disregard of neutrality treaties, there is no telling what conditions may be a week or two hence. I am quite sure there will not be the least danger to non-combatants who remain quietly in England and mind their own business, but there may be a good deal of inconvenience, and it is surely no time for a pleasure-trip. . . . Perhaps the war won't last long, though that seems hardly probable.

I have a splendid room with three big windows looking out over the North Sea and I can tell you it gives one a thrill to watch the English battleships go by, moving northward, and to realize that in a few days one of the greatest naval battles in modern times may take place only

a few miles away! Every one here is excited about the war, yet things go on about as usual and the bank holiday crowds yesterday were rather larger than usual. Yet the English fleet is mobilized and the army in process of mobilization, and the papers are full of the war to the exclusion of everything else.

It is remarkable how completely the Irish situation seems forgotten and all thoughts concentrated on whether or not England shall intervene. I have great sympathy for the Norman Angell followers, who in the main, I believe, are right and who are opposed to war unless England is actually attacked. It needs great courage to take this stand at a time like this, more than anyone can realize who is not here. But I believe Sir Edward Grey and the Government are right in supporting the neutrality of Belgium, even by force, and in preventing France from being too severely injured.

Do read Norman Angell's books now ("The Great Illusion" and "Foundations of International Polity"). They are really epoch-making and you ought to understand his position, especially at a time like this. However much his views may need to be qualified by fuller experience of 20th century conditions, there can be no doubt—it seems to me—that he is fundamentally right. He is no "peace at any price" man and he realizes that as long as unenlightened nations believe that material benefits can be gained by aggressive war, the enlightened, who see the fallacy of this point of view, must still arm. But he has taken an enormous step in advance of the older sentimental peace advocates, high-minded and useful as they are, and he is right in believing that the only solution is sounder public opinion among great masses of people.

North Cromer, August 8.

Dear C.:

It is hard to realize, sitting quietly at this window overlooking the North Sea, that the war which has always seemed a nightmare of the yellow journals has actually begun. The last week, although I have been shut up in my room, has been one of the most thrilling I have ever passed through.

If anyone has believed that England was decadent and unable to face a great crisis he should have been here since Tuesday night and seen the way the nation took the news and set itself to reorganizing the national life on a war basis. He would not have kept his belief in decadence very long! Outside of a few Jingo newspapers—and they, rather mild under the circumstances—there has been no brass band demonstration on the one hand nor panic on the other; only an immensely impressive energy and concentration on the business of getting ready. The Government, though the war came most unexpectedly and at a time when Parliament was worn out with the bitterness of the Irish controversy, rose to the occasion and in less than a week has accomplished a most remarkable feat of organization, not merely in the way of mobilizing the regular army and navy and territorials and preparing hospital service, coast defence and other military services but also in re-shaping a great part of the financial, commercial and industrial activities of the nation. No great war has been fought under modern conditions, or since the establishment of a world-wide and highly sensitive system of international credit, so there were few precedents to follow.

In all this activity what has struck me has been the absence of confusion and aimless excitement; the quiet, purposeful way in which the nation has set itself to work under what cannot fail to be considered able and effi-

cient leadership. That a supposedly easy-going, sport-loving, non-regulated and non-centralized people, suddenly called to such a task, should be able to shake itself free from shock and at once begin planning and working, shows a genius for effective organization as well as the more common qualities of courage and steadiness.

Another thing that is most striking is the unitedness of the nation in the face of danger—the instant abandonment of internal disputes. Party lines in Parliament, even the bitter dissensions over the Irish question, were wiped out for the time being. Redmond's stirring promise that England might withdraw every soldier from Ireland to-morrow and leave her coast to be guarded by Nationalists and Ulster Volunteers—a promise that Carson backed up—furnished the best sort of foundation for a compromise on the Home Rule question until the war is over. Unionist ex-ministers are working with the Cabinet daily and F. E. Smith, a Unionist firebrand who a few weeks ago was pouring abuse on all Liberals, is running the official news-bureau by government appointment!

I am delighted to see that public opinion in the United States is so nearly unanimous in its sympathy with the Triple Entente as against the Triple Alliance. With all my liking for the German people and with every effort to see the German-Austrian side of the case, I cannot doubt that Germany planned and forced on the war (look at Sir Edward Grey's speech on Monday the 3rd), nor feel anything but abhorrence for her conduct since the crisis began. Fortunately the group of militarists who seem to be in control of her affairs have already shown themselves to be as stupid as they are arrogant and conscienceless—and by their bungling have lined up almost the whole world against them. One thing seems fairly sure, that if Germany is beaten the result will be a popular reaction among

Germans against their present form of government—as in France in 1870 and Russia in 1905. Military defeat may be a blow to the ruling oligarchy.

North Cromer, August 10.

Dear K.:

I am just beginning to get American papers of about August 1st telling how the first threats of war were received at home. . . . I am delighted to see from them, as well as from the more recent reports in papers here, that American opinion is almost wholly on the side of the Allies.

The papers here have been giving quotations from a little group of men in Germany who have been working for years to bring on something of this sort, and particularly from a book by General Bernhardi, highly endorsed by the Crown Prince. They are exceedingly illuminating—the most brazen programme that you can imagine. I remember well, when I was in Germany, how men connected with the Government service had absorbed this point of view and were always quoting and praising the historical writings of von Treitschke, a Prussian, now dead. He was brilliant but belonged to the extreme wing of this school.

Their propaganda has had a tremendous effect throughout Germany. Most of the influential Prussian newspapers (except those representing the more liberal and largely Jewish financial interests), and South German papers like the “Frankfurter Zeitung,” were written chiefly from this point of view. For instance, at Wernigerode, the T.’s got virtually their whole idea of the outside world from the “Tägliche Rundschau,” a poisonously narrow, Jingo, Pan-German sheet, and would not listen to any other opinions, and their brother, an East

Prussian Königliche Bauinspector, was even worse! Such papers, and even some of the better sort, are under the thumb of the Government—especially in the field of foreign politics.

Under such (comparatively recent) influences the older intellectual and humanizing elements of German opinion have become weaker, and the younger generation has gone mad with a dream of military and naval predominance for the German Empire. An interesting article from the "Times" which I am sending you describes this condition of "swelled head" into which a great part of the nation has fallen. . . . I know that there are other enormously important sides to the German character, and I was extremely fond of them when I was there, but I can verify from my own experience much that these English articles say.

Many of the English writers are surprisingly detached and free from bitterness, but they emphasize the fact that such a state of public opinion, held by a nation as powerful as Germany, is a world-wide menace while it continues and must be put an end to in the interest of European peace.

No one here would have listened to the suggestion of waging a war for this purpose, but now that leaders of German opinion have precipitated the crisis, a large section of English opinion welcomes the chance to settle the matter—at least for a generation or so—and I can't help having a lot of sympathy with this feeling.

Go back to the Agadir incident or Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, or only last winter, Zabern—and it is hard not to wish these Prussian bullies humiliated! At bottom I see the truth—and the greater importance—of the Norman Angell point of view, but I confess my lower nature is often to the front, these days, as I read war news!

I want to see Germany, after her treatment of Belgium, beaten to her knees—I want France to get back Alsace-Lorraine, and Servia to get Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet at the same time, the more level-headed part of me realizes that over-harsh terms only mean permanent bitterness and the acute danger of another war. Defeat itself would be a bitter enough pill for Germany to swallow, and for the good of Europe her position as a great state should be left to her.

I am sending you most of the current issue of the "Nation" with an article by Lowes Dickinson and one by Norman Angell—I could n't altogether agree with them in their opposition to the war—but I know that they are the really helpful and far-sighted leaders of opinion. There is also a fine tribute to Jaurès.

Things go very quietly here on the East coast—though from my window the other day I watched, with a spy-glass, two English torpedo boats capture a German merchant ship and tow her toward Yarmouth. A destroyer goes up and down the coast patrolling every morning, and often aeroplanes go by. The roads are full of troops—though less so now that mobilization is nearly completed.

North Cromer, August 18.

Dear K.:

Perhaps the most interesting thing that has happened since I last wrote is the Czar's manifesto to the Poles. Much of it reads strangely, coming from Russian lips—I wonder that a Russian bureaucrat could read it with a straight face, in view of recent history! But I believe, nevertheless, that it is sincere. Indeed, Hanotaux writes that the Czar outlined the plan to him in 1896, soon after his coronation, with genuine enthusiasm, and has been

honestly meaning to carry it out ever since. This is quite possible. I only hope his advisers won't persuade him to change his mind, if Russia wins! France and England will do their best to hold him to his promise. At any rate it is a fine stroke so far as immediate effect is concerned.

Did you read about the death of young Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, son of the former German Ambassador to England and one of the first German officers to be killed, in a frontier skirmish? I remember him at Prof. Endemann's house in Heidelberg, a modest and winning young fellow, about my own age. All he had time to say before he died, after the French came up to where he lay, was "I've done my duty to my country, gentlemen, as you are doing yours." It is what one would have expected from a man of his type, and makes the war, all at once, seem close at hand to me. I am as sorry for Germans of his sort, whom I like and admire, as I am bitter against the stupid, arrogant type of Prussians who have brought on this tragedy.

My marginal notes on the articles I have sent will have shown you how I feel in general about the war. I want it to be conclusive, and to put an end, once for all, to the sort of terror under which Europe has been living for the past decade, with the resulting burden of armaments.

I was rather amused at the instant "resolutions" condemning the war and calling for arbitration, which were introduced in Congress—by some of the very men, too, who have fought arbitration treaties and worked against the repeal of the Panama Tolls Act! Even if sincere, such resolutions are futile mockery in a crisis like this. As if the nations that have plunged unwillingly into what they know will be a life and death struggle would now be held back by any Mrs. Partington's mop of this sort!

The President's offer of mediation was a different mat-

ter and well enough in its way, though to my mind a bit premature. No one here considered it officious, however, as they did the "resolutions." Indeed, everyone realizes that American "good offices" may be immensely helpful later on, and they now have a high personal respect for the President, especially since the Panama Tolls matter. His strict preservation of American neutrality, for instance, is favorably commented on. But nothing could be more undesirable than a premature or indecisive ending to the war, and fortunately no such result is in the least likely! Terrible as it is, the war seems destined to bring about a number of valuable results; but it may take a long time.

North Cromer, August 21.

Dear K.:

I am sorry I can't give you more vivid personal descriptions of what is going on here. This little place is so cut off—it is two miles from the nearest town—that all my news comes from the papers. In many ways I wish I could have been in London during these last weeks—but until the hot muggy weather there is over I don't want to go back, especially as I have n't been over well lately, and this place agrees with me splendidly. Later, I want to be in London—perhaps within a couple of weeks. This war is n't going to be over in a month, or in a year.

Within the last day or two the German advance in force has begun, and the first great battle of the war is actually under way. Very little news comes through and the papers are careful to emphasize that the real fighting has hardly begun and that German successes are to be expected at the start.

The news sent out by the Wolff Bureau, the semi-official German agency, and by German writers, continues to be a

remarkable assortment of distorted facts and baseless fabrications. Many of their methods, especially those of German residents in foreign countries, are, to say the least, peculiar!

I think President Wilson has rather overdone the business of American neutrality, especially when he urges private citizens not to discuss the war or take sides. It is right to make Government officials and army and navy officers keep quiet, and, of course, private citizens must n't act in a way that tends toward a breach of the peace, but beyond that it is unreasonable to expect people to keep from forming opinions as to a controversy in which most of the world is engaged. . . . Also, I fail to see any sound reason for forbidding private bankers to finance loans to the belligerent governments, though I am quite humble and open to argument on this point.

I am sure the strong expression of American sentiment at the beginning of the war was a good thing and an eye-opener to the Prussian governing clique. How, for heaven's sake, if neutral nations don't express their opinions, is anything like a general public opinion in regard to these great and urgent questions to be arrived at?

I will send you soon a review of the German official "White Book" setting forth their side of the case. I want to be fair and to see all sides, but that is a different thing from hanging on to the fence. . . . I hope that the entrance on the scene of Japan isn't going to have a bad effect in the United States. In view of their very clear promise to limit their action and to give back Kiau Chau (if that is how you spell it) to China, and in view of the fact that the English Government, which wishes to retain American good will, knew of their intentions in advance, I hope any misunderstanding will be avoided.

North Cromer, August 24.

Dear K.:

No more letters from you since I last wrote you—as a matter of fact it is only three days ago! But I hope before many days to hear that my letters have begun to reach you again.

I have been much interested to read about the campaign which the German-American Press (apparently with the aid of a contemptible section of the Irish-Americans who are utterly out of touch with the leaders of Irish Nationalism over here) has been conducting for the purpose of winning the United States to the German side. I hope it will fail as completely as the reports here indicate it is likely to. It is just these sections of American opinion which have been, in the past, the worst offenders in setting selfish racial interests ahead of American patriotism in such matters as arbitration treaties with England, Tolls Repeal, etc.

British-Americans are not following suit, I am glad to see. American opinion in favor of England is not, I believe, based on mere racial feeling, but on a reasoned dislike of Germany's aims and policy. For this reason I don't believe an essentially racial attack on the generally adopted American attitude can alter it very much—even if, as I fear, the Hearst papers should follow their usual line of cheap attacks on England and appeals to racial prejudice.

The strongest line, clearly, that the German press can take, is to attack Russia, exploiting the feeling in America against Russia's bad record, calling her the aggressor and ignoring every other aspect of the situation. Personally, much as I hate Russian brutality and obscurantism, I honestly believe that Prussian militarism and ambition toward world sovereignty are a more *pressing* danger to civiliza-

tion. I think, too, that most of the talk about "Russian barbarism threatening German culture" is sheer rot,—quite irrelevant. Prussian militarism is a far more insidious danger to German culture than any Russian attack, and German "culture"—the real thing that all of us admire—is never going to be advanced by aggression, or insane ambition toward territorial aggrandizement or military prestige.

German culture did n't lose ground when Napoleon held all Germany, and it certainly has n't benefited of late years by the growth of Prussian prestige. This is n't of course to say that Germany had better have stayed weak and disunited, but that successful military aggression is the last thing likely to benefit the very culture on behalf of which these specious arguments are being made—even, I am sorry to see, by men like Harnack!

It is n't as if there were a real danger of Russian conquest and absorption of Germany. . . .

Also, how has the extension of German culture—say in Bosnia—benefited humanity? This whole line of argument only distracts attention from the real issue.

One should remember, too, that while practically no Germans are now under the rule of Slavs (except those in the Baltic provinces of Russia, whom even extreme Pan-Germans like Bernhardi hardly dream of bringing back into the German Empire), millions of Slavs are being held, very much against their wills, under the domination of Germany (in Posen and W. Prussia), and of Austria-Hungary, and that Austria-Hungary is greedily reaching out, with Germany's approval, for new territory and a controlling interest in the Balkans.

In view of these facts it is a brazen absurdity to talk about the "Russian danger" merely because Russia's policy of protecting the minor Slav races and building up a

strong Balkan federation stands in the way of German aggression. Of course Russia defends her fellow Slavs and if she also wants to free from German and Austrian rule those who are aching to be freed, I, for one, don't much blame her.

There is no evidence, apart from German assertions, that she would ever have brought on a European war for this purpose. She went to the very limit in persuading Serbia to accept the excessive demands of Austria. . . . It was only the bare-faced attack on Serbia's very existence as an independent State that roused Russia to her defence. I sincerely hope that at the end of the war the various national groups which Austria-Hungary (the Magyars are even worse than the Austrians) has been hanging on to and repressing for generations will be joined to the respective nations with whom their real sympathies lie. Austria had better become a member State in the German Empire, and Hungary, stripped of her subject races, be left to stand alone, or to make terms with the strong new Balkan federation. If only as many as possible of these old danger spots can be wiped out, the chance of future world wars will be lessened.

The dismemberment of a unified national State with strong racial sentiment and a desire to be left undisturbed (*e.g.*, Denmark in 1864 and France in 1870) is the stupidest sort of crime and is certain to bring trouble. The dismemberment of an artificial conglomerate like Austria-Hungary, which is almost splitting apart of itself, would be a step toward permanent peace.

The Balkan States are preponderantly Slavic, and if the establishment of a Balkan federation means—as is probable—an increase of Russian prestige and influence, such an increase is only founded on natural and insuperable factors. Germany has no right to oppose it in the interest

of an unnatural Teutonic sovereignty over that part of Europe. If the Russian power threatens Hungary or any non-Slavic State which is weak or isolated, the remedy is an international guarantee of neutrality such as England and France are fighting to uphold in Belgium.

I believe these considerations, in addition of course to the strong case which Sir Edward Grey established against the final chapter of German diplomacy, entirely demolish the arguments which Germany is trying to pass off on the United States. The danger to the Russian liberal movement—that military success may be likely to increase the prestige of the anti-liberal forces—will be partly offset by Russia's closer contact with France and England, and the active efforts, I hope, of the latter.

I was delighted to-day to find in the "Nation" an article by Wells which takes much the point of view that I have been working out for myself for some time back. It has a fair attitude towards Russia in general, though I don't agree with him in brushing away the enormity of Russia's treatment of the Jews. I quite appreciate that there is a real difficulty here—the helpless Russian peasants are no match for the type of Jewish trader or money-lender common in Russian villages, and their hatred, much of it, may be spontaneous and not artificially stimulated—but this is no excuse for the Russian Government's having handled the question as it has. I really know next to nothing about this Russo-Jewish question—this is only my general impression.

I have been reading with the most intense interest Bernhardt's "Germany and the Next War," of which I have heard a great deal. In a few days I will send it on to you. It is the most brazen defence of an abominable, reactionary point of view which I have ever come across—so brazen that its very brazenness has a blunt honesty which

is almost attractive. The man is evidently a serious relic of a century or two back, personally no doubt an admirable character, who would have been most useful, say, in the 17th century. The significant thing about the book is that it fits in with and explains a large body of German opinion, as one gathers the latter from newspapers and magazine articles, speeches and, in my case, every-day conversation with people of all sorts. It startles one chiefly because the thesis is carefully thought out and carried to its logical conclusion. It probably goes farther in many directions than most Germans would be willing to follow, but there is no possible doubt that it faithfully represents the character and tendency of such propaganda as the Navy League, the Pan-German movement and a large and growing section of German thought—popular as well as educated thought. There are, no doubt, large elements of public opinion opposed to this point of view—it is to combat these elements that the book was written—but the opinion which it represents is the opinion which has forced on this war. That is why the book is so important. It is the whole conception of international relations, national life and world development which it upholds which must be the irrevocable aim and final justification of the war to destroy. I shall be surprised if you don't feel this as intensely as I do.

I am inclined largely to discount the charges of brutality made against the German soldiers, but some of the methods which the German Government has unquestionably sanctioned—*e.g.*, indiscriminate use of mines, indemnities from Belgian cities, seizure of hostages, as well as its rule that non-uniformed defenders of an invaded territory are to be treated not as combatants (as they are under English military law, subject to slight modifications) but as outlaws and murderers—are as detestable as its treatment

of Belgian neutrality. Most of the alleged cruelties are no doubt traceable to this different point of view in regard to what English manuals call a *levée en masse*, but this does n't make the German theory any less harsh and revolting.

I hope the feeling apparently aroused in America by Japan's intervention has since quieted down. It is quite natural for us to distrust her a bit, but I believe it is unnecessary in this case. It would be a pity if this incident, played up for all it is worth by the German press, were allowed to confuse our whole attitude.

I hope our Government will not allow the purchase of the Hamburg-American ships and the payment to Germany of \$20,000,000—especially since we fell over backward in the matter of the proposed French loan. This would be distinct partiality towards Germany, and Senator Lodge, who is now in London, has come out with a protest against it, although he says that reports from America may be misleading and the Government may not contemplate anything so one-sided.

North Cromer, August 25th.

Dear K.:

This morning comes the news of the fall of Namur—a blow which was unexpected and which will prove a serious danger to the Allied armies. I only hope it may not be as bad as the papers seem to fear; at least they are honest with the public, however over-censored the news may be. I could hardly feel more anxious and keenly interested if it were our army that was fighting. . . . I try to keep open-minded towards the German point of view—but I confess I feel pretty strongly!

On one point on which I had not felt very clear, I have

now made up my mind ; that however badly the Germans may be beaten in the end, if things go as one hopes, yet their colonies in the main should be left to them. I believe they have distorted England's position in the past as to "hemming them in" and preventing their acquiring, even by fair means, any territory for the overflow of surplus German population, and personally I do not think it necessary for Germany to control all of the regions where Germans settle—she would gain little by such control—but it must be admitted that England sets great store herself on controlling the regions where Englishmen settle, and Germany's desire for German-controlled colonies is understandable and unobjectionable, so long as she does not try to grab other nations' colonies by brute force. She came late into the game of colonial expansion and cannot blame other nations if they insist in holding on to what, partly owing to her lack of foresight, they have already acquired. But if the other nations try to keep her from following their example (and they may possibly have been guilty of this in the past—I do not think Sir Edward Grey takes this position now), then Germany has a valid complaint against them and one with which I sympathize. To deprive her of her present colonies if she is beaten would give force to this complaint and cause a bitterness prejudicial to the chances of permanent peace. I except Kiau Chau because of the way in which Germany seized it, and because I believe that for Germany to meddle in the Far East is dangerous to the integrity of China. The fact that other nations have in the past seized and are holding Oriental possessions to which they have no better claim does not excuse a continuance in such practices, in a particularly flagrant form, in the 20th century. Germany has, however, large commercial interests in Asia Minor, and if with the consent of Turkey she can expand her pres-

ent footing there and find an outlet for her energies and surplus population in that direction, while at the same time developing a backward region, I do not think England and the Allies should take an attitude of jealous opposition—so long as Germany does not try to seize Constantinople or threaten English communication with India. The Constantinople problem is one for which I make no attempt at a solution—it is too complicated for my present state of ignorance! I have gone into this question because I want you to see that I am trying to consider both sides.

I am keen to hear again from you what the people at home with whom you talk are thinking about it all. Please send any magazines or articles that show how American opinion is shaping. English opinion, Liberal and Socialist as well as Tory, is almost wholly favorable to the war—that is, it believes that the Government did right in declaring war, however terrible and unwelcome the war may be, and that it has an unanswerable case. A small group, mostly from the Radical wing of the Liberal party and from the Labor party, and represented by Ramsay Macdonald, Arthur Ponsonby, Keir Hardie, Bertrand Russell, and others, attack the action of the Government in intervening as wrong and unnecessary. This group is nothing like as strong as the Pro-Boers fifteen years ago, but is composed of similar elements. I heartily admire their courage and sincerity but disagree with their reasoning. Their chief criticism of the Government is not so much for its recent actions as for not having, years ago, broken loose from the whole theory of the “Balance of Power” and from the entangling *entente* with France, which had been handed down from a Conservative administration. This entanglement, they say, was concealed from the public (I do not think this is true), and, like the rest of England’s foreign policy, subject to very slight

popular control, has prevented England from acting in a purely impartial way as a mediator. I believe that in spite of the *entente*, Sir Edward Grey did act as a substantially unbiased mediator and went as far as was humanly possible in this direction.

As a statement of what is desirable for the future, and what, it is to be hoped, will be feasible after the war, their point of view is sound and just, I believe. As a criticism of Sir Edward Grey's policy up to the present, it seems to me unfair. It fails to take account of the actual difficulties in the way of an English foreign minister and of the extent to which public opinion in other countries is less advanced than in England. Even here most people are not up to this point of view yet, and an English Government cannot disregard the mass of the nation in order to carry out the ideas of an advanced section. Also, while the ideas put forward in Bernhardt's book continue to have the vogue which they now seem to have in Germany, I believe the nations which are opposed, in the main, to such doctrines must take thought for their defence and stand together. (It was Bismarck who forced France into the Russian Alliance, for example.)

The critics of the Government also ask, as a test question, "Suppose France had been first to violate Belgian neutrality, would England have attacked her?" I believe that, according to published documents, Sir Edward Grey's final offer that if Germany would make any fair proposal calculated to secure peace, and if France and Russia refused to agree, he would abandon them in spite of the *entente*, shows pretty clearly what his attitude would have been if France had been the aggressor. As a matter of fact, France instantly promised to observe Belgian neutrality, while Germany refused. The fact that the French border was considered impregnable to a quick

assault and that Germany's whole military plans for years past have depended on a sudden attack by way of Belgium before Russia could complete mobilization, is no excuse for Germany breaking a treaty which she had solemnly re-confirmed (at the second Hague Conference in 1907, in the "Convention" there adopted). The efforts of the peace party here in England to make it appear that in so doing she was excused by necessity are a weak and indeed actually wrong-headed part of their arguments. Germany should have thought of this "necessity" before she forced a general war; and the truth is, of course, as her railway system shows, that she did think of it long ago and went shamelessly ahead nevertheless. England does not accuse her of any deep-laid plot to destroy the British Empire—indeed, it is clear that Germany hoped England would stay out of this war—but she does accuse her of planning cold-bloodedly to extend German-Austrian power at the expense of Russia and France, by methods similar to those which she used in the Bosnia-Herzegovina "shining armor" coup in 1908, and of caring little, so long as her side proved the stronger, whether such methods plunged the world into war. Also, of refusing, even when war became imminent, to submit the Austrian case to the decision of a concert of powers on the ground that it was "unworthy the dignity of a great State like Austria" to submit her freedom of action to the settlement of a "European Areopagus," as might a minor Balkan State: *i.e.*, taking the position that it was nobody's business whether or not she brought on a general conflict! Also, of breaking faith with a smaller, weaker nation and with the world, and endangering that faith in solemn agreements on which all intercourse depends.

It is such considerations as these, overlooked by the English peace party in their anxious effort to be fair to the

other side and loyal to the cause of world peace, that justify England in fighting to the last gasp to put an end, once and for all, to such pretensions by any country.

North Cromer, August 25th.

Dear K.:

I can't resist adding a line or two to the enormous letter which I sent off to you this morning, as I have been reading copies of the "New York Times" of the 11th and 12th. I must say that, strongly in favor of England as I am, I think the American papers as quoted in the "Times" have been a bit unfair in their personal attacks on the Kaiser and the stories which they are printing of German "atrocities." The Kaiser has plenty of faults and is in a position which no man should occupy, but I believe that in the past he has honestly worked for peace to the extent of jeopardizing his popularity with his own people. He has exposed himself to bitter attacks. The truth is, I think, that the war party and its doctrines have been growing in strength and have overcome the Kaiser's natural inclination towards peace—either by winning him over or by making themselves too strong to resist.

As to "atrocities," I believe now that most of such stories are fictitious or exaggerated, and in so far as they are true, are true more or less of both sides. For example, the populace of Brussels got out of hand and destroyed German lives and property—though on the whole the Belgians have been just and decent towards their enemies. So in Berlin, the crowd got badly off its head at one time and behaved outrageously—but in other places French and English people were treated with great kindness. The discourtesies shown the French and Russian Ambassadors and Consuls was rather disgraceful and not matched by

anything similar in France or England or even in Austria. Also, the German theory of war with regard to civilian participation is harsh beyond that of other nations; but nothing is gained by making out that the German army as a whole are brutes and murderers! (I see, though, that the German-American papers are even more unfair to England and France and quite beyond arguing with.)

North Cromer, August 28.

Dear K.:

I am sending you two very interesting articles from August reviews on the Balkan-Austrian situation just prior to the war. The one by von Sosnosky, "The Balkan Policy of the Hapsburg Empire," quite bears out what I wrote in my last letter (before I had read either of these articles) and shows Austrian foreign policy in a far from amiable light! Sir Harry Johnston's article, "Germany, Russia and Austria," is by a far abler man than von Sosnosky. He is a friend of the J.'s; a Liberal and a colonial administrator, with a distinguished career. He, like von Sosnosky, describes German and Austrian policy in the Near East, and while he shows that it might have been developed in such a way as not to be harmful to the other countries involved, he also shows that the Prussian spirit—the spirit of overbearing aggressiveness and lack of any generosity in dealing with conquered races—was bound, if persisted in, to make their policy distasteful to all other nations and bring it to grief. In itself, if it had meant merely the peaceful extension of German influence toward the Southeast and the gradual *attraction* of Balkan peoples into a great confederation, with Germany and Austria playing a controlling part, such a policy would, I agree, have been one with which England should have had no oc-

casion to interfere. I said in my last letter that England should not oppose Germany's reasonable expansion of influence in Asia Minor. Even if such a policy had antagonized Russia, and if Germany had been unable to come to an understanding with her, I believe, as he says, that England should have kept hands off and let them settle it between themselves.

But as the other article (von Sosnosky's) shows, this was not the spirit in which they went about gaining their ends; and although it was the situation in the West which finally brought England into the war, the case of the Triple Entente in the East is also a sound one. Sir Edward Grey showed in the Balkan negotiations last year that whatever he thought personally of the justice of her action, he was willing to give Austria a pretty free hand, and that he would never have blocked any legitimate Austro-German designs in this direction. But this was n't enough for Vienna and Berlin, and now they will probably lose everything!

The two "histories" of the war (issued by the "Times" and "Daily Telegraph") which I am sending you, discuss the causes leading up to it and make clear what I have always felt, that for years past Germany has been the trouble-maker: *i.e.*, in the Algeciras incident, the Bosnia-Herzegovina row (though this, I believe, originated with the Austrian Crown Prince), and finally, the Agadir trouble, each of which came near to bringing on war. Very likely she did n't actually want war at any of these times, but she wanted to use the threat of war to further an essentially aggressive policy. To gain her ends by reasonable agreement or compromise has not been her way for the past twenty years. She regards war or the threat of war in the same light as Treitschke and Bernhardt, as a mere incident

in her general policy. This I think is proved up to the hilt, and it is this which must be put a stop to.

Recently Bernard Shaw came out with a statement that while he approved England's declaration of war on other grounds, the general denunciation of Germany for her violation of Belgian neutrality was mere hypocrisy. That, under circumstances similar to those in which Germany was placed, England would have done the same thing and would have found an excuse for it as she always has for her conduct in the past. I have tried to think this out for myself without bias—and I am convinced that it is a mischievous perversion of the facts. I believe more than ever that Germany's action deserved all the denunciation which it has aroused. It is a well recognized rule of international law that the use of a neutral's territory by either belligerent for any purpose is a violation of neutrality. If consented to it involves the neutral in hostilities and probably war with the aggrieved belligerent. In this case, for example, suppose Belgium had allowed Germany to march her troops across to the French frontier and use Belgian territory as a base. France would probably have declared war on Belgium, and would have been quite justified in so doing. Even if she had not, suppose the campaign had gone against Germany and her troops been forced back on Belgian soil—the French must have pursued and Belgium, while nominally neutral, would have suffered all the losses of a war carried on within her borders. What possible right had another State to demand that she put herself in this position, even aside from all questions of solemn pledges and guarantees? It was perfectly possible for Germany to act on the defensive within German territory. Belgium was "necessary" to her only as a means of attacking France (France having just as-

sured both Belgium and England that she would not violate Belgian neutrality).

England has done things in the past that are hard to defend, but I don't think she has ever sunk to quite this level of shameless brutality! Even if it be argued that a merely defensive war with Russia and France as antagonists was fatal and that swift attack on France offered the only hope of success (an unsound argument, I think, in a war in which Germany had Austria as ally and only two antagonists—for this argument was advanced *before England came in*), still the fact remains that Germany need never have put herself in a position where she would be faced with such an alternative. Also, both the writings of her generals and the known arrangement of her strategic railways show that for years, in spite of recent assertions to the contrary, she has cold-bloodedly planned to make use of Belgium in just this way. Bernard Shaw had better find some worthier paradox to support! I believe he is honest, but his hatred of hypocrisy makes him see it where it does n't exist. His fondness for the off side has led him into a false position. No one could read Sir Edward Grey's and Asquith's speeches and find the slightest touch of hypocrisy in the anger which Germany's proposals roused in them.

An interesting suggestion, which is likely to be carried out, is that lecturers—persons thoroughly familiar with European history—be sent about the country to make clear to English citizens the exact causes of the war and the principles for which England is fighting. A number of university professors have volunteered already. Some labor leaders have felt that such lectures might degenerate into "Jingo spellbinding," but if this danger be avoided, the plan ought to prove a good one.

As I have thought over the question of the United States

purchasing the Hamburg-American ships and using them to export grain, possibly through Holland to Germany, I realize that since we are sending grain to England there can be little objection to our doing the same for Germany —though, of course, either English or German war-ships could seize such grain as conditional contraband. Wells, in his "Appeal to the American People," which I am sending you, admits our legal right to send grain in this way, but urges us for the sake of shortening the war not to make use of this right. This is, I am afraid, hardly fair to Germany! The sounder ground of objection to our purchase of the ships is the direct aid to Germany of the \$25,000,000 payment and the indirect aid of relieving them from the heavy cost of maintaining the ships idle. So long as they stay shut up they are a burden to her, and if they come out she risks losing them altogether. Our purchase of them might be a blow to England's naval efficiency and her ability to injure Germany's commerce. So I still hope the plan will not be carried out. The seizure, too, of conditional contraband in American Government-owned ships by English war vessels might easily lead to friction. Starving out Germany is an essential part of England's policy, and she could not possibly abandon any legitimate means to this end. Feeling here continues grateful and cordial to America.

By the way, if you want extra copies of the war histories or any articles I have sent you, to pass on, let me know. The "Daily Telegraph" history seems to publish all the diplomatic correspondence preceding the war quite fully. Also, if you can get me a copy of the official German pamphlet "Why Germany Went to War," which is said to have been circulated widely in the United States, I shall be very grateful. It is hard to get hold of here, only reviews and criticisms of it having appeared.

All remains quiet here on the East coast.

North Cromer, September 1st.

Dear K.:

I am sending Bernhardi to-day—also the “Daily Telegraph” history and several interesting articles, particularly one by “Politicus” from the “Fortnightly” which gives quite a new view of the Kaiser’s personal responsibility for the war. I must say the author makes a strong case. The published official report of the British Ambassador’s last days in Berlin certainly shows up the Kaiser in an unpleasant light.

Do read the first seven chapters and the last of Bernhardi’s book (the rest are more or less technical), for it is one of the evidences of modern German opinion, at least in high circles. The Crown Prince praises it to the skies! I shall also send you, when I have read them, J. A. Cramb’s “Germany and England” and Usher’s “Pan-Germanism”; both of them, to judge from the reviews, the more convincing because of the extent to which the authors have themselves been influenced by the appeal of this new German gospel of “efficiency” for the purpose of armed aggression. I am sending reviews of both books.

The “Daily Telegraph” history is fairly free from one-sided comment, but it does not publish all the official documents and gives in some respects an incomplete record of the sequence of events. Don’t bother with Courtney’s introduction—it is thin and superficial. Dr. Dillon’s articles, written from Vienna, seem to me rather reactionary but are valuable as giving Austria’s point of view.

From all the diplomatic correspondence several points seem to me to emerge clearly. In the first place, Germany was greatly to blame for refusing Sir Edward Grey’s proposal of a four-nation conference. She gave no sound reason for such a refusal. In the second, while the Chancellor and Foreign Secretary von Jagow worked honestly

up to July 31st to prevent war, their efforts were not only feeble, but were hampered by the character and sympathies of the German Ambassador at Vienna and by the apparent understanding between him, the Kaiser and the Austrian Government, quite inconsistent with the German Government's avowed position. In the third place, I have seen no adequate justification for the Russian Government's action in converting their partial mobilization into a general one, and this seems a most unfortunate mistake on their part. However, their excuse that Germany, under cover of what is known as a proclamation of "Kriegsgefahr," was to all intents and purposes mobilizing against them, may have been right. Russia has no such provision for a legally disguised mobilization, and as she requires nearly twice as long to mobilize as Germany on account of her great distances and lack of railway facilities, it was natural that she should not want Germany to get too great a lead. Still, as I say, I feel she would have done better to keep her record entirely above criticism, whatever provocation was given.

Finally, and most important of all, the Kaiser's action in sending an ultimatum to Russia with only twelve hours for reply, was absolutely inexcusable. Mobilization, though serious, is not war. It could have been sufficiently met by full mobilization on the part of Germany and Austria, which would have left an opening for King George's eleventh-hour offer of mediation and for the negotiations which were still going on between Petersburg and Vienna, and were admittedly more favorable at that time than at any earlier stage. The Kaiser's brusque ultimatum was equivalent to a declaration of war and put an end to any hope of a favorable settlement. It is this act which must bear the chief blame for finally precipitating the world war.

I have just received the English "White Book," and when I have read it I will send it to you. It is worth noting that the English Government publishes merely the documents and lets them speak for themselves. The German "White Book," on the other hand, gives only a portion of the correspondence and prefaces it with a long argument justifying its own position.

I feel confirmed in thinking that Sir Edward Grey's critics have been unfair to him. Their two main points are mutually contradictory—for one is that he was compelled by his relations with France and Russia to act, not as an impartial mediator, but as their ally,—and the other, that his position was so non-committal up to the last moment that Germany gained no clear idea of England's intention and was led on to actions which she would have avoided had she known that England would fight!

The true explanation seems to me to be that while all the world knew that England was a friend of France and Russia and to a certain extent bound to stand by them, Sir Edward Grey, for the sake of peace, abandoned for a time this position and made such extreme efforts to act as an impartial peacemaker that he gave serious alarm to both France and Russia. If Germany had shown any real willingness to help him, the war could have been avoided. At the same time, he gave Germany several clear warnings but refused to commit himself to any of them as long as there was a hope of maintaining peace. Germany's complaint that he showed solicitude as to France's colonies and prestige, but none as to Germany's, is absurd. At that stage of the game, when war between France and Germany had practically begun, of course England had to think first of her ally. She could not be expected, whether she fought or not, to remain unmoved when her ally was actually attacked; but this by no means casts doubt upon the sin-

cerity of her *earlier* efforts for peace at a stage when the whole situation was different.

In fact, the more closely one studies the documents, the more strikingly do Sir Edward Grey's character and methods shine by contrast with the German statesmen. His proposition to the German Chancellor at the eleventh hour, that if the crisis could be averted he would work for a concert of the powers, gives promise for the future, since he, more than any other one man, seems likely to shape or influence the final settlement.

Austria's position, while I cannot sympathize with it, is at least clear. Her leaders honestly believed that Serbia's existence as a strong, independent State was incompatible with the prosperity of their own country, and they had at least some ground for so thinking. To them it was a simple question as to which of the two rival States was to be crushed (or, in Austria's case, disintegrated). I think myself that they have their past misdeeds largely to thank, and that even at the present time their safety does not necessitate the destruction of Serbia—still less, ambitious designs toward a forcible hegemony over the Balkan States or a seaport on the Ægean. But one cannot, after all, expect them to see the matter quite disinterestedly, or to admit that the breaking-up of the Austrian Empire would be a desirable thing and a step towards a more secure peace! But Germany,—she had no such excuse for disturbing the whole *status quo*. With her there was no question of merely preserving her present power and avoiding a danger honestly feared. Her only possible motive for raising a disturbance was a desire to fish in troubled waters. . . .

This dastardly burning of the entire older portion of Louvain has made me see a bit red, I must confess! It was so entirely wanton, even if all that the Germans say—

which seems open to grave doubt—were true as to civilian attacks. I hope America will take the lead in arousing neutral nations to protest against such barbarities. Possibly, our Government cannot act, but certainly the American people ought to have no personal doubt as to where they stand in regard to such actions. I hope the Belgian delegation, which is now on its way to America, will meet with a warm reception and will secure some practical assistance in protecting their gallant little country against such damnable outrages. Do write me how they are received.

The methods of the German Ambassador and his efforts to stir up bad feelings in America against Japan will not bring him much success, unless I am greatly mistaken. Write me what America is thinking of it all—the America that the “New York Times” doesn’t tell me all about!

Sheringham, Norfolk, September 4th.

Dear K.:

I have moved over to Sheringham, a few miles from Cromer. It is practically on the water’s edge, or rather the edge of cliffs overhanging the beach. I am counting on this splendid air and plenty of exercise to put me in first-rate condition again.

I am sending you the September “Contemporary” with an interesting article by Dr. Dillon—also a lot of newspaper clippings and articles from the September “Nineteenth Century.” The ones by Sir Harry Johnston and J. Ellis Barker are especially good. It is interesting to see that they take practically the same view as Dr. Dillon: that Germany is acting like a maniac and must for the sake of safety and civilization be not only beaten but rendered powerless for further harm. The task seems likely

to take a long time, far longer than the first estimates—but I can't doubt that it will be accomplished in the long run. At any rate, England has set her teeth and will fight on for twenty years if necessary, or until she is destroyed, before she will consent to make peace on terms that do not insure Germany's suppression. This is no exaggeration, but only sober fact. At the start public opinion was inclined to treat the war lightly, as something that might be over in a few months. Now people talk of a year, or several years. There is some hope that Germany's resources will be so exhausted that she will be forced to stop. I hope so—but I should rather see a five-year war than an inconclusive peace.

Recruiting has taken a jump during the last few days and is progressing at the rate of 30,000 a day as against 7,000 or 8,000 a day the first few weeks. It took the news of the first heavy losses to the British army and of the brutalities of the German soldiers to wake the nation, and Germany will learn during the coming months what a force she has raised against herself.

One good result of the increased seriousness of the public opinion will be—I hope—the settlement of the Irish question, in spite of a very unfortunate revival of party bitterness in the House on Monday. That incident apparently frightened even the participants, and there was no doubt of the intense disapproval of the public at large. A good sign was an editorial in the "Daily Telegraph," one of the most out-and-out Tory papers, which I am sending you, urging a settlement on what I feel are very fair lines: *i.e.*, the passage of the Home Rule Bill now (it will become law automatically on the adjournment of Parliament), but with a provision postponing the date on which it is to take effect. This will give time for the passage of an amending bill before there is any question

of the bill's coming into actual operation, and will obviate any legitimate fears on the part of Ulster that the Nationalists may get an unfair advantage from the war. When the amending bill does pass, I believe it will provide for the exclusion, without time limit, of the four unquestionably Protestant counties (Armagh, Antrim, Derry and Down), and of parts of Tyrone and Fermanagh, those parts which are predominantly Protestant. Possibly a bill of this sort can be agreed to before Parliament adjourns—this would be an ideal solution—but it can only come if Carson and his Ulstermen abandon their absurd demand for the exclusion of the whole of Tyrone and Fermanagh, in both of which counties there is a small Catholic majority. It would be a crime if a small group of selfish bigots could cheat the rest of Ireland of the Home Rule for which they have already waited too long, and which, since Redmond's fine speech, even fair-minded men on the Unionist side are convinced that they deserve. The strongly Protestant corner of Ulster should not be forced in against its will, but I believe there is little doubt that it will join the rest of Ireland of its own accord, if the settlement that I speak of is agreed to. At any rate there is already a very different feeling among Unionists toward Home Rule. England at last, with few and decreasing exceptions, feels cordially towards the Irish people, and the news of the way the Irish soldiers fight at the front wins enthusiastic admiration. Tell K. and H. and P. that they should be proud to-day of their country, and that I believe there are good times ahead for Ireland!

I am glad to see that the burning of Louvain has aroused people in the United States to active protests. I hope this will be felt in Berlin! I have no use for a neutrality that keeps quiet when such things are being perpe-

trated. I am glad to see that the German Ambassador's campaign of justification is falling flat already.

The most disagreeable feature of the whole business, to me, is the conduct of men like Harnack and Eucken—whitewashing their Government's record! It shows how widely the poison of Prussian militarism has worked. One could understand their keeping quiet in a moment of national peril, though men like Ramsay Macdonald over here have n't hesitated to oppose the action of the English Government—mistakenly, I believe, but with sincerity and courage. The kind of political views upheld by Harnack and Eucken are a disgrace to German scholarship. The only excuse I can find for them is the long-continued distortion of foreign news in the German papers; but scholars ought to have outside sources of information and some independence of moral judgment. It does seem to show that, with all their erudition and fine qualities, German professors, like the bulk of their countrymen, are incompletely civilized.

It occurs to me to warn you not to take too seriously the criticism by Wells, that I sent you, of the way in which the recruiting is being handled here. There was some basis for it, and I hate as much as he does the "Maffick" press, but his criticism lacks balance and is bad-tempered. Things are n't going badly now.

Sheringham, September 5th.

Dear Mrs. J.:¹

Thanks very much for the "War and Peace" magazine and two copies of the "Labor Leader." I read them last night with great interest, but I do not agree with Ramsay

¹ The "Mrs. J." to whom this letter, and two others, were written is an English friend with whom he often discussed politics, and whose judgment and knowledge of these questions he greatly valued.

Macdonald or the letter from a soldier at the front. The latter seems to me hopelessly unfair to his own country and inaccurate as to facts. I can't believe that he represents the point of view of more than an infinitesimally small proportion of the army or the nation. Ramsay Macdonald is, of course, of a different calibre, but I must confess that his two articles made me angry and disgusted. After a night's sleep I am able to consider them more dispassionately (!), but they still seem wrong-headed and unfair to the Government.

I think if you had lived, as I have, for a year in Germany and listened to lectures by German professors on history and politics and talked with people of all sorts on the subject of international relations and got the "feel" of the modern German attitude towards other nations, you would agree with me that this war could not have been avoided—that it was brought on by the gradual poisoning of German public opinion by professorial and militarist propaganda, and that until the Germans have been beaten and made to realize the disastrous results of their present attitude, there will never be real peace. In their state of mind before the war it was useless to argue with them—they simply laughed and "knew better"—I have heard army officers quote Treitschke till one was sick. Bernhardt's views, which "War and Peace" refers to as confined to a tiny minority of militarist extremists, were table-talk at pensions where I stayed, and among students at Heidelberg; not in the form of reference to his books but as commonly accepted notions. English Liberals may not believe this, *but it is so*.

Now with a nation in this state of mind, especially when it is *led* by men imbued with the same ideas (see their speeches and articles in the poisonous German press), the only thing that will awaken them to the real meaning of

their mental condition is a tremendous shock. I believe they will get such a shock and that it will have a profound effect. Not that, all at once, the German nation by a sort of miracle will undergo conversion—but I believe they will be forcibly awakened from their hashish dream and started thinking in an opposite direction.

Possibly this could have been brought about in time by well directed educational work. Certainly no one would have dreamed of forcing on a war in order to accomplish it. But what has happened is that Germany has forced war on the rest of the world, and now, horrible as it is, I believe the good results will in the long run outweigh the bad. Many peace advocates like Ramsay Macdonald believe that instead of decreasing the military spirit in Germany, defeat will increase it. I think they misread present facts and the teaching of history. What happened in France after 1870 (aside, that is, from the resentment over Alsace-Lorraine), and in Russia after 1905? If the (*hoffentlich*) victorious Allies refrain, as I am convinced they will, from seizing essentially German territory, I don't believe there will be any repetition of the national military revival which followed Jena. The German colonies are more of a danger-spot, and I hope they will be spared, since the nearest approach to a legitimate grievance that Germany has is that her overseas expansion has been thwarted. I don't think this complaint is sound—see Sir Harry Johnston's article in the September "Nineteenth Century" as to England's recent concessions and readiness to make fair arrangements—but I don't want the Germans to have any excuse for alleging unfair treatment or for harboring thoughts of a "revanche."

Of course I believe, with Lowes Dickinson and Wells and every sane observer, that the alliance system must go and a more or less formal "concert of powers" take its

place. I doubt if anything so ambitious as Dickinson's plan can be effected at once—but I believe that something which will have the practical advantages of such a plan will be brought about when the war is over. See, for example, Asquith's Guildhall speech, as a justification of Sir Edward Grey's efforts already in this direction and an indication of the future attitude of the Government.

What I don't agree with and consider thoroughly unfair and lacking in a sense for realities, is the criticism of Sir Edward Grey for his failure to achieve such results *before* the war. Such criticism entirely overlooks the contemptuous refusal of the German Government to have a part in any such effort (not merely at the last moment but for a long time back), and fails to consider the extent to which average continental opinion lags behind Liberal and Socialist thought in this direction. No such plan stood the ghost of a chance of being considered in the face of Germany's attitude or so long as she and other nations were increasing their armaments. Ramsay Macdonald's talk about ten years' educational work being sufficient seems to me arrant nonsense. *Of course*, such work must go on, and in the long run nothing else can achieve adequate results—but there is nothing gained by talking as if the impossible could be made possible merely by the efforts of one well-meaning and enlightened foreign secretary.

Another thing Sir Edward Grey's critics fail to remember is that, as the result overwhelmingly proves, he did represent and satisfy the majority of his countrymen. He could not fairly be asked to go far in advance of them, supported only by a small group of men ahead of their time.

I hope that you will not consider me a backslider into English "Prussianism," beguiled by the "Maffick" press! I have done nothing for the last month but read and think about the causes and the bearings of the war, and tried to

put my ideas into words in long letters to my sister. I have spent hours going over the "White Book" and have read everything that I could get hold of on the German side and from the critics of the Government here in England. I have tried hard to be fair and open-minded. I can't come to any view but that which I have been trying, very inadequately, to express to you. Indeed, the more I think and read, the more convinced I become.

I have had a lot to do with "reformers" at home. They are my best friends! I hope I am, to some extent, one of them and that I am sympathetic toward their point of view. But I have found that the more advanced—with whose views I often completely agreed so far as the future was concerned—were very unfair critics of the men who are trying to make the present machinery of government run. These latter are often quite at one with the advanced thinkers in criticising existing conditions, and even in regard to the new conditions which it would be desirable to bring about. But they are forced, day by day, to meet practical obstacles which even the fairest of advanced thinkers seldom takes into account. Probably it is best for the world that reformers don't think too much about the obstacles, but concentrate their energies on making clear to others the end to be achieved; but, *just for this reason they are seldom sound critics of current events*. All shades of approach to the pure white of their ideal become merged, for them, in an undifferentiated dark gray! Whereas to onlookers these various shades may differ widely in their relative blackness or whiteness. In so far as the reformers do differentiate, they are apt, in their effort to be hard on themselves and fair to others, to see as blackest the deficiencies of their own city government, or nation.

These ideas are platitudinous but they bear directly on

the present situation. The critics of the Government have forgotten, largely, the difficulties with which it has been faced. In their efforts to be fair they have lost their sense of proportion. This has been particularly evident in regard to Germany's breach of Belgian neutrality, on which point the attitude of men like Ponsonby (whom I immensely admire and respect) and Bernard Shaw and Macdonald is to me simply inconceivable. They distort all the facts leading up to the final declaration of war. After all, one's own nation is not *necessarily* wrong or belief in the justice of her cause necessarily unenlightened! They appear to start from the premise that it is. Treaties are treaties and the very foundation on which all public morality and all hope of better international relations rest. If France had done what Germany has done, I firmly believe that England's public opinion would have condemned her and the English Government would have given her a sharp warning to halt. The assumption that England's protest was hypocritical and that she merely wanted a pretext for supporting France seems to me demoralizing and calculated only to shake one's confidence in the judgment of the men who maintain it. These men have fine records—they are valuable public leaders—but for just this reason they owe it to themselves not to descend to this level. They have been unfairly abused in the press and are doubtless smarting under a sense of unjust treatment and impotence to accomplish the ends for which they have striven, but this is no excuse for bitterness and unfairness in their own criticism of others—far less, for turning white black and black white in the effort to prove their case.

It is in just these respects that Norman Angell and his group have shown up so well. They have refrained, so far as I have seen, from personal attack or criticism and have

turned their entire energy into constructive work looking towards the terms of peace and what will follow. This is the true work of the reformer, in which he is of inestimable value. Even in their case, however, greatly as I sympathize with their aims and methods, I think that from their preoccupation with long-range views, they undervalue the immediate advantages which may fairly be looked for as a result of the war, and insufficiently emphasize the difference in moral standards between the German and English Governments, as shown by official documents. I don't at all mean that I think war the best way of securing these advantages—only, that war was inevitable, from Germany's conduct and views, and that being so, it is worth while to get as much comfort as possible from the justice of England's cause, and the real benefits which are fairly within sight as the result of a victory for the Allies. I include among the latter a rearrangement of the map of Europe on the basis of the natural principle of nationality and the wishes of the inhabitants. Another advantage would be the complete discrediting, in Russia, of Prussian bureaucratic and militarist ideas (to which in the past have been due many of the worst crimes of Russia's rulers), and an openness to English influence and thought. I do not agree with Wells's exaggerated hopes of immediate regeneration in Russia, but still less with the intolerant bitterness of many English Liberals and the majority of my own countrymen towards an abstraction which, in their ignorance of the real Russia, they have set up to represent her. The "diabolical Russia" of some labor leaders is as unreal as the "Holy Russia" of the "Morning Post." But I am honestly convinced that there is less danger to civilized international relations from a successful Russia than from a successful Germany.

I can't go into a detailed discussion of the "White

Book" or the broader grounds on which I base my condemnation of Germany, and if I did you would be too bored by this time to read it—but I do feel that if there ever was a righteous war, and a war in which England was not to blame, it is this one. This is fully as strong as my conviction about our own Civil War, and I only hope it will be fought on the Allies' side with Lincoln's steady indomitableness—and terminated in the spirit which Lincoln showed towards the Southerners.

Of course there is danger that in conquering Prussian militarism the rest of the world will become contaminated with the same ideas. But surely there was at least a similar danger in the spectacle of a phenomenally prosperous and successful Prussia, brazenly increasing her power, in spite of diplomatic blunders, and winning the unwilling admiration of other countries. It would have been hard, for example, in the coming decades, if Prussia had continued to get what she wanted by her recent methods (either with or without war), to convince such undeveloped nations as Servia and Bulgaria that these methods were not the best. In view of the (probably) unforgettable failure of these methods, it will be an easier task to prove that honest mediation and friendly co-operation are not only more moral but more practically successful.

As for England, it looks as if the war was helping toward a better understanding with Ireland—though heaven knows there is still the most awful stupidity and wicked prejudice standing in the way of a settlement! The success, so far, of the voluntary enlistment system (in spite of Wells's bad-tempered criticism of recruiting arrangements and the foolish hounding of young men, which he rightly attacked) will go far to discredit any first steps toward conscription, like "compulsory training." Of course Lord Roberts and the other "Prussians" will shout

for it when the war is over, but I believe they will find even less public support than they did before the war. The insidious, unconscious growth of "Prussian" ideas will be far more dangerous, but—though perhaps I am merely a shallow optimist—I have faith that they can be overcome. The "horrible example" of Prussianism will be fresh in the public mind if Liberal leaders only make good use of it.

I did n't start out to inflict such a screed as this on you—but I wanted, since reading the articles you sent, to try to show why I disagree with them and what my own point of view is. When you have sufficiently recovered from the strain of wading through it perhaps you will be good enough to mail it to my sister, as it sums up several things I have tried to say to her, and I know I shall never rise to such an effort again!

Sheringham, September 7th.

Dear Mrs. J.:

I have just finished J. A. Cramb's "Germany and England" and have been so much impressed with the matter—not the point of view—that I am taking the liberty of having a copy sent to you. The first three or four chapters are well worth reading, and the fact that the author is a "Prussian" himself, of the deepest dye, largely owing to the early influence of Treitschke, makes his testimony only the more important. The chapter on T.'s influence in modern Germany is particularly interesting and my own knowledge bears out what he says. Along similar lines is Usher's "Pan-Germanism"—an independent testimony from an American point of view, by a man who, like Cramb, has evidently felt the false glamour of modern German ideals. The vigor and honesty with which these

romantic Jingo views are held, and the immense practical intelligence with which it is being sought to put them into effect, make them all the more dangerous. I can see now the good kind Fräulein at whose house in Wernigerode I spent the summer of 1907, with the little tin war-ship bank in which she was trying to get contributions for the Navy League, and I can hear her ready-made views on foreign affairs, all trustfully taken from the poisonous "Tägliche Rundschau." Her brother was a "Königliche Bauinspector" from Ost Preussen. He and I climbed the Brocken together, and his myopic bitterness against the English and general views on international politics made me want to tear his hair at intervals. And I can still hear young Doctor M., at the pension in Heidelberg, calmly declaring: "Of course, every one knows that the only way England conquered and held India was by making all the Hindoos drunk"—and this young man was an able medical student and a Ph.D.! Professor O., too, son of a well-known historian, and lecturer on Modern Diplomatic History, was always ridiculing the English statesmen and exalting Bismarck. This sort of thing, which one met in widely different parts of Germany and among widely different sorts of people, cannot be overlooked.

My own feeling at the time was that the Germans, with all their intelligence and culture, are in matters of human intercourse which are essential to generous, mutually tolerant and chivalrous relations between human beings, undisciplined and incompletely civilized, and nowhere is this truer than in university circles.

Their political thinking is still dominated by memories of Frederick the Great and Bismarck; and the sufferings and glorious revival of 1813 to 1815, followed by the successes of 1864-67 and hallowed by a sentiment like that of our own grandfathers and fathers for the American Revo-

lution and the Civil War, have turned their ambitions and hopes in a false direction. Then, too, the shallow brilliance of the present Kaiser's personality and his curious (though, I believe, partly sincere) leanings towards peace, have had a bad effect on the naturally romantic temperament of the Germans, something like Napoleon III on France. Just as the latter, with his satellites, cheapened the traditions of the Revolution and of the First Empire and brought ruin on his nation, so the Kaiser and the men around him, building on the sincere and misguided teachings of a generation of German professors (Treitschke, for example, might parallel Lamartine), have cheapened the traditions of Frederick and Bismarck and have now brought their nation to disaster. The tradition in each case, though it had within it the germs of unsoundness—false dealing, brutality, perversion of patriotism—had a basis of true grandeur, and the glamour of success added to it, enabled it to capture the imagination of the people. But in each case the unsoundness became evident, eating like a canker to the heart of national life, and, culminating in the reign of a brilliant and shallow ruler, brought its inevitable punishment. The sham idealism with which the Germans have clothed the 18th-century ideal, the atmosphere of keen modern critical thought in which they have developed it, and the organized efficiency with which they are seeking to put it into effect,—none of these alter its essentially reactionary character or moral unworthiness. They only add to the tragedy.

Of course, a false national idea like this, held by millions of people, can't be overcome by war, although war can have an important effect by the mere shock and stimulus toward readjustment which defeat may bring. France was certainly sobered by the *débâcle*, though resentment at the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the need for maintain-

ing the prestige of the army (see the Boulanger and Dreyfus incidents) interfered with the awakening of a worthier national spirit which is now so evident. Only an English "Prussian" could believe that you could thrash a man into sounder ways of thinking, but thrashing can sometimes be a preliminary to open-mindedness on the part of the "thrashee," which no amount of peaceful propaganda, not even ten years of Labor party and Socialist propaganda, can accomplish. When your intended convert hates and despises you and believes that your efforts towards peace are merely a cowardly effort to keep the "swag" of past depredations from a sturdier and younger adventurer, viz., himself, patience and persuasion are rather thrown away! Even generosity towards a man who is aching to demolish you is apt to be wasted until he has forced you to regretfully administer a good licking. *Then* it is essential.

In the long run it is only propaganda work that brings results, but it would have been hard to make anti-slavery propaganda successful in the South before the Civil War; and the modern Germans are in some ways not unlike our ante-bellum Southerners. They believe in their militarism as the Southerners believed in their "peculiar institution." They try to promote it with the same hot-blooded, arrogant ruthlessness. Their professors defend it with the same fervent consciousness of moral rectitude as the Southern clergymen defended slavery. The South forced on the war, as the Germans have done. Was the North wrong in fighting? Did the ideas of the South conquer its conquerors?

Please forgive this second lengthy outburst—but I feel so strongly that Keir Hardie and Ramsay Macdonald, for all their courage and sincerity (though with a tendency to hit a shade below the belt), are wrong about the war, that

I can't hold in! Like every enthusiast, I want the friends whose opinion I respect to agree with me.

P.S. The important thing for enlightened Liberals is to make clear why they are supporting the war and what they believe England is fighting for; not to let the English "Prussians" becloud the issues or make use of war to push conscription and false ideas of what national interest demands. This should be easier because of the odium which Prussian "Prussians" are bringing on their own doctrines, an unpopularity which even their English counterparts are forced to take account of. All that lies bound up in Jingo ideas of conquest was never easier to bring home to "the man in the music hall" than at the present time. Emphasis on the sound justification for the war and the advanced British ideals which are sought to be upheld should offset the cheap conceptions which we find in the evening papers and even in some of the morning papers. The "Times" has on the whole been pretty sound, in spite of a rather smug horror at the wickedness of the Germans. The "Nation" is doing this sort of work splendidly. "War and Peace" is very properly keeping on its own lines and looking forward to the terms of peace and what will follow. If all the leaders of liberal thought lend a hand, I don't believe the "Prussians" will profit much by the war.

But unfair criticism of the Government will only weaken the critics' influence when it is most needed.

Sheringham, September 11.

Dear C.:

I am having sent you to-day a package of books, etc., bearing on the war. Will you keep a copy of each for

yourself and give the extra ones where you think they will do the most good? I will gladly send more if you can use them to advantage. I am keen to have as many people as possible at home realize what this war is about. The English "Nation" has been admirable and gives a good idea of how even the most advanced and pacifist section of English thought feels toward the war.

The opposition here is small; nothing like what it was at the time of the Boer war, being confined generally to the Independent Labor party—the Socialist branch, not to be confused with the larger body, the Labor party, which with the great Trades Union Congress is heartily supporting the war and urging its members to enlist and to recruit. The Fabian Socialists, represented by the "New Statesman" and by Wells's articles in various periodicals, are also vigorously behind the Government.

Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 3rd is one of the chief documents for the English side, and is splendid evidence of his position—also Asquith's Guildhall speech of September 4th.

Personally I believe that Norman Angell is right about war in general, and I hope the result of this war will be the end of the system of alliance groups and an establishment of a more or less formal "concert of powers," which can grow in time into something like a federation of the States of Europe. Probably it will not be possible to make the first step a very drastic or sweeping one, but the growth of the English constitution shows clearly that new precedents, apparently unimportant in themselves, may prove in the long run of vast importance. What is needed is conscious turning in a new direction; further progress will be sure to follow.

Sheringham, September 8th.

Dear K.:

Just after I had sent off my last letter to you, came yours of the 23rd, and I was glad to hear that you were neither seriously ill nor permanently estranged! I shall be interested to hear further what you think of the war. The latter *and what may follow it*, occupies most of my mind nowadays.

I enclose in this letter, so that you will not miss it in the mass of other clippings, a fine article by Wells on "America's Opportunity" (indeed, duty), in connection with the war. It is just what I have been thinking and what I tried to say the other day in a letter to Mrs. J.; one of two long ones (which I asked her to send you), in reply to some articles by Ramsay Macdonald in the "Labor Leader" and "War and Peace." I had hardly thought out just what America's duty in connection with the settlement should be, but it seems to me very important that the British "Prussianism" should not be allowed by Liberals to misstate the issues of the war and secure at the end of it an undesirable settlement. It is "Liberalism" (in the best and widest sense of the term), all over the world, that is at stake and that stands, if the Allies are successful, to win really great and permanent benefits for mankind, and Liberals must not let this be forgotten. That is why I endorse Wells's views in regard to America's interest in seeing that the settlement is made on liberal rather than reactionary lines. So strongly do I feel the importance of this that I have ordered 200 copies of the article to send to friends at home to distribute. I want the people who think and who direct thought to get this idea as soon and as strongly as possible.

I am reading a good deal of modern history these days, besides all the newspapers and periodicals I can lay my

hands on. If you have time, I should suggest J. Holland Rose's "Development of the European Nations, 1870-1900" as a good book to begin with. Another is Seignobos's "Political History of the Nineteenth Century"; another, Wickham Steed's "The Hapsburg Monarchy." I have n't read this but it is well spoken of.

Sheringham, September 11th.

Dear K.:

. . . As to Wells's article, I don't like the idea of any foreigner dictating to us which side we should take, even if he is on the side which I consider right—and the way the Allies have, on the whole, as compared with the Germans, refrained from doing this has been a help to them among fair-minded Americans. But asking us to use our influence to make the settlement the basis of a sound and lasting peace is a very different thing, and this I heartily approve. The English "Prussians" are almost as bad as the German ones, and the same may be said at least as strongly of their French and Russian colleagues. The important thing is to get all the liberal-minded elements in these countries and in the *great neutral countries* to work together for a far-reaching settlement on liberal rather than on Jingo-imperialist lines.

If you want to get the difference vividly between the two points of view, read Leonard Hobhouse's splendid "Democracy and Reaction" in contrast to Cramb and Bernhardi. Every American can do something to help build a sound point of view in our own country.

To judge by the papers that I get and extracts from other papers that I see, the foundations for such an opinion are ready and waiting. President Eliot's interview, as

reported here, seemed to take very clearly the right point of view. . . .

The main impression that I find in my mind after reading Cramb is the tragedy of a national ambition gone wrong; of a national ideal, once not unworthy or unsuited to its age, remaining narrow and finally becoming, in a more enlightened generation, a curse and danger not only to the nation which held it but to the world. This is all the more so because of the world-wide prestige and undoubted sincerity of this nation. One might say that ideals, like all living things, in order to live healthily, must grow and keep pace with the changing world around them. If they do not they will decay and fester and spread all manner of demoralization.

In the time of Frederick the Great the policy of territorial aggrandizement, carried out by force and fraud, was something very different from such a policy to-day. When founded on sincere patriotism, assisted by the principle of nationality as against dynastic compulsion as the basis of a State, and carried out with courage and far-sightedness, it was distinctly admirable in comparison with the 18th-century standards. Still more so was the burst of national feeling, the military and political and spiritual revival of 1813-15. But it was unfortunate that, even then, military strength (contrasted with their national feebleness), and a narrow and aggressive patriotism (in contrast with their highly enlightened cosmopolitanism, in many ways unsuited to its age), were glorified and over-emphasized. The growing generation came to feel that all that was fine and worth preserving in the national life was bound up with these two ideals.

Then began, after the struggle for liberty, the struggle for German unity. First the Liberals of the type that afterwards came to America in such numbers and took

such a prominent part in the Civil War, the idealistic but unpractical dreamers, had their whack, and after months of useless wrangling accomplished next to nothing—nothing, that is, toward a unified Germany. They did succeed in their various state governments, particularly in South Germany, in securing the adoption of constitutions and numerous liberal reforms. But in the Congress at Frankfurt they got no further than a few unimportant modifications of the old futile confederation that followed the Napoleonic wars.

Then came Bismarck; his fight with the Liberal Diet in Prussia, resulting in the creation, by almost illegal means, of a strong, well organized army; the wars with Denmark, Austria and France and the founding of a modern German Empire. No wonder that not only the Prussians but the more liberal and easy-going South Germans were dazzled and carried off their feet! Here was the great end which the best of them had dreamed of for generations, achieved in such a way that Germany jumped all at once from a subordinate position in Europe to the undisputed primacy of the continent. No wonder they came to rather despise the liberalism which had done little more than talk and to exalt the “blood and iron” policy!

These results, however, as many of the best Germans themselves saw, had not been achieved without cost;—how heavy, probably few were then able to realize.

The old German idealism, love of liberty, and friendly cosmopolitanism were discredited—particularly after the school of von Sybel and Treitschke had systematically exalted the unworthy along with the worthy qualities of Frederick the Great and Bismarck. The nation had come to believe that military strength and forcible aggression were the only means to national greatness. Bismarck’s treaty-breaking, systematic abuse of the influence of the

press, brutality toward weaker nations, underhand and unscrupulous diplomacy and actual bribery of governments and individuals—faults which show up far darker against the background of the 19th-century civilization than had Frederick's against the 18th century—were either minimized, or, worse still, exalted into the necessary accomplishment of a patriotic foreign policy. What had gone far to excuse these flaws in the national ideal had been the really great ends toward the accomplishment of which this ideal had been directed: national liberty and national unity. Now since these ideals have both been secured, no really comparable national *need* remained or has since arisen to take their place—at any rate, no one clear guiding aim, offering an easily understood foundation for the whole national policy. Only a boundless ambition remained, fed by the pride and overweening self-confidence resulting from such an immense growth of prestige; occupied with recent territorial acquisitions rather than more solid national achievement;—an ambition for mere size and power and military glory, apart from any uses to which such power could be put. It is as if the soul had died out of the national ideal, leaving it only tawdry and meaningless.

Of course the Germans feel that they have such a conception—some vague idea of “spreading German culture” and founding a new Germanic world-empire. But one feels instinctively that these ideals are not sound in *quality* and that they are not in keeping with the best thought of the present generation. This is the more convincing, now that we see them at work and see the results that they are producing in action, both in the present temper and behavior of the German nation at home and the armies beyond its borders. Even if culture could be spread, in

this day and generation, by force, it certainly can never be spread by force applied in this way!

But it is all one huge tragedy—one of the greatest in history—for *the German nation*. For the rest of the world, in spite of the terrible suffering involved, and the setback to social progress, I truly believe that it will bring a reward far beyond these evils, and set future social progress on a sounder foundation. In this reward Germany will eventually share.

Sheringham, September 14th.

Dear Mrs. J.:

Many thanks for your last letter and the manifesto of the Civil Union—and the letter from Macdonald, Angell and Trevelyan. I assure you your opinions have n't been "suspect" except at the time when I first read the two "Labor Leader" articles. Then I did wonder a bit whether you might agree with Macdonald. After I got your letter in answer to mine, such minor doubts as I had quite vanished away. I am glad you like the "English Review" article and found Cramb interesting.

As to the manifesto of the Civil Union and the letter, I agree with almost everything they contain—but I am afraid that I have, to some extent, lost confidence in the judgment of the men back of them. . . . This applies hardly at all to Norman Angell but very much to the other two. I hardly feel prepared, without further consideration, to back this particular movement. In the first place, if a person so predisposed to agree with them and, from their point of view, so "sound" as myself, can't help distrusting them a trifle, how is the mass of moderate people in all parties likely to feel—not toward the ends they are after, but toward their leadership? You have pointed

out, yourself, how the Tory press has received their announcement. May it not prove that the leadership of just these men at just this time will hinder rather than help the very cause they are working for? I am afraid that not only rabid Tories, but even moderates, may read in the movement (because of their distrust of its leaders) more than is really intended, and may from blind fear and prejudice take an actually more reactionary stand than they otherwise would. Besides, it seems to me the situation is n't so bad and discouraging, as it is. Churchill's speech sounded quite the right note. Even in papers like the "Observer" and the "Pall Mall Gazette" it is being repeatedly urged that the final settlement must respect national feelings and must create no new "Alsace-Lorraine." This is only one point, but it indicates that the very fervor with which the Tory press is attacking *Prussian* militarism is almost unconsciously leading it into opposing many of the characteristics of militarism in general.

There is, to be sure, considerable tendency on the part of the "National Service" advocates to say, "I told you so," but hardly as much as one would expect, and all the facts are combining to prove the adequacy of the voluntary army theory—only the voice of the egregious Mr. Maxse is raised in really bitter attack on Liberal principles and leaders—and I can't believe such cheap vituperation carries any weight with the moderate mass of the nation. Therefore, I am inclined to think that a too active pressing, just at this time, of the ideas contained in this pamphlet, *by this group of men*, will not do good.

As to the settlement itself, I am firmly convinced that it should not come until Germany has been thoroughly beaten. Anything which the German ruling class could by any stretch of the imagination regard as an indecisive

result would be disastrous. After they are soundly thrashed and realize it, after the mass of the German nation has been startled out of its present hallucination, then will be the time to talk openly of fair and generous terms, of which I am entirely in favor. When that time comes, I believe a far larger number of thoughtful people than we now expect will come very close to agreeing with and supporting the plan of settlement proposed in the pamphlet. I can't believe the English will be vindictive. Perhaps all this is too optimistic—but anyway it is what I believe!

I have not yet written Wells, because of several articles which I have since seen, indicating a certain irritation in America over a tendency on the part of some writers, English as well as foreign, to advise the United States as to its own best interest. I don't think there is much cause for this feeling, but editorials in a number of papers show that it exists. Wells is somewhat to blame because he *has* advised us as to our interests, a matter in regard to which, as American papers quite properly point out, we are entirely capable of forming our own opinion. Churchill's interview also erred a bit in this direction. Presenting the facts to us, refuting German lies, asking for our aid in securing a sound and liberal settlement at the end of the war—all of this is eminently wise, and, so far as I can see, Americans have welcomed it and shown their sympathy with England spontaneously and enthusiastically. But *warning* us is another matter, as is also any effort to drag us into the conflict against our will.

Wells's article, "America's Opportunity," starts with a warning. What I first saw in it and seized upon, and still think admirable, was his appeal to Americans to recognize their duty in promoting the right sort of settlement. It is this which I hope will be impressed on the leaders of

American opinion and spread over the country. But because of the slight tension at present, and the somewhat unfortunate opening of Wells's article, I want to go a bit carefully in bringing it to the attention of American friends. I shall send it accompanied with a word of explanation. Also, in writing to Wells I want to make clear just what I am trying to arouse support for at home.

You may be amused to hear that, in spite of first impulses, I decided that it was none of my business to lecture him on his ill-tempered reference to Norman Angell! I quite agree with your desire to keep American friends in touch with the best Liberal point of view here and shall be glad to help in any way I can.

Sheringham, September 15.

Dear K.:

Among the best pieces of news that have come so far is the magnificent wave of loyalty that has spread over India. When the news was read in the House of Commons, even that decorous assembly went wild with enthusiasm. Equally inspiring is the almost unanimous loyalty of South Africa. This is wonderful proof of the fundamental soundness of English colonial administration. Now that the Government have at last, thank goodness, announced their intention of passing the Home Rule Bill (in spite of an ill-timed partisan protest from the Unionists), the only serious exception to England's fine record in the treatment of dependent nations has been cleared away. What a contrast to Germany's handling of the Poles, Alsace-Lorraine and West Africa!

You are quite right about the improvement in the American papers since the first few days of the war. I notice it especially in the "New York Times." One ex-

cuse for their publishing so much rubbish was the impossibility of getting reliable news through over the cables. The censorship was ridiculously stupid and obstructive at first. It has since been put under a Press Bureau and greatly improved.

President Eliot's article in the "New York Times" of September 7th was fine. I am delighted to see that he endorses the view of American neutrality which I expressed in a letter to Mrs. J. President Wilson defined it too rigidly. His refusal to take any steps, at the request of the Belgian mission, to investigate atrocities for which a strong *prima facie* case had already been made, seems to me a mistake (although I appreciate the motives which led him to place so strict an interpretation on neutrality). We owe a duty to the world as well as ourselves. I am open to conversion on this point, but that is the way I feel now. I don't see why an impartial investigation should involve us in any undesirable way.

The manifesto of the English authors which I sent you is an interesting contrast to the manifesto of the German theologians! It handles the "Kultur" argument in the right way. I also sent you lately some interesting articles by Russian liberals showing their attitude toward Russia's part in the war, and their expectation of what the result will be if she is successful.

I have just finished reading "Pan-Germanism" and find that I detest the author's point of view even more than Cramb's romantic militarism. Usher, like Cramb, studied in Germany and evidently absorbed the cynical attitude toward all international relations that underlies the very policy which he is describing and which characterizes modern German thinking in politics and history. Morality has no place in international politics; every State is the natural enemy of every other, except in so far as two or

more combine to further their selfish interests at the expense of others; a State can benefit itself or even maintain its position only by forcible aggression (approaching more or less closely to war); "all" nations, whether they attempt it or not, act only from motives of unscrupulous self-interest, and so on, *ad nauseam*. I wholly dissent from this conception of modern world politics—as I need hardly tell you. I believe that any State which bases its policy upon it is as stupid and short-sighted as it is barbarous. His attempt to justify this view on the ground of "impartial scholarship," superior to hypocritical prejudice, is entirely unconvincing. Impartial scholarship does not require any one—least of all an American with our traditions—to leave out of account all the achievements of civilization in the way of generally recognized standards of national conduct. Only the worst type of modern German scholarship could fall into such a fallacy. He imputes to all nations indiscriminately (in his otherwise interesting and suggestive summary of recent European history) the most Machiavellian intentions and unscrupulous ambitions. This, it seems to me—and several good reviews of the book agree on this point—often leads him to draw wrong deductions from well-known facts, and even his facts themselves are occasionally inaccurate. It lends to his descriptions of international intrigue an E. Phillips Oppenheim atmosphere of melodrama which I can't believe is true to life. I am sure, for example, that the United States cherishes no such deep, far-reaching schemes of aggression in Central America as he imputes to her, though this is what most Germans devoutly believe! I am sure that England and France have not acted recently from the motives he alleges. England, for example, has been honestly trying for several years past to come to an agreement with Germany, and has abandoned her

former tendency to a stupid obstruction of Germany's efforts at expansion, especially in the Near East. She has been quite willing to further, so far as she was able, all Germany's legitimate ambitions which did not unblushingly aim at the spoliation of other nations.

Germany could have gained all she had any right to expect, including control over new territory for the settlement of her expanding population, if she had been willing to confine herself to honest and open negotiations with the Triple Entente. But she has let herself be carried away by the mad belief in armed aggression, and now she will pay the penalty. An American at the present time finds it hard to believe that a civilized nation can possibly be under such delusions, or cherish such barbarous intentions—but the answer is "Belgium"!

In spite of the serious defects in Usher's book, it is worth reading. The most valuable thing about it is the strong evidence it gives of the ambitions and beliefs of modern Germany—evidence too strong to be discredited. Prince von Bülow's "Imperial Germany" (to say nothing of Bernhardt), many of the best-known German historians and political theorists, a host of pamphlets and most of the German newspapers and periodicals take the same point of view. The "Anglo-German Problem" by Sarolea bears witness to this.

There is no use whatever in well-meaning peace enthusiasts in America (and I am as strongly against war as any one) proposing any premature settlement of this great struggle. It would only leave Germany free to arm to the teeth and begin the war again as soon as she saw a favorable opportunity. The Allies will not listen for a moment to any such proposal. Only by killing Prussian militarism can they lay the foundation for any sound and lasting peace.

There is some danger—I can see it from following the English papers as closely as I do—that in fighting Prussian “Prussianism” the Allies may become more or less Prussianized; may seek at the end vengeance rather than justice, and material rewards rather than a fair and lasting settlement. I do not believe that such a result is likely—or at least in any crude form—but the forces making for reaction even in England are not to be neglected, and in Russia they will need careful watching. All those in neutral countries who are liberal-minded, and who are anxious that the settlement should be “progressive” in the best sense of the word, should *combine* to throw their influence in favor of such a settlement.

It must not be premature but it must be fair and enlightened!

Sheringham, September 22.

Dear K.:

I was much interested to hear that D. felt so strongly on the side of the Allies. You might send him the pamphlet issued by the Oxford Faculty of History and the September number of the “Round Table.” I have just finished reading the first three articles in the latter, and they are even better than the Oxford pamphlet. The second of the three, particularly, is the sanest, the most temperate and at the same time vigorous analysis of the Anglo-German situation that has yet been published. It is a magnificent statement of England’s case. The third, with a valuable ethnographic map of Europe, is an almost equally good analysis of the Austro-Serbian situation, though it does not get down to such bed-rock principles as the second. They are worth preserving.

I am especially interested this week in the German Gov-

ernment's attempt to place England in the wrong before the world by making it appear that Germany would now be willing to stop the war and call it a "draw," but that England and the Allies are vindictively bent on humiliating and dismembering the German nation! Of course, the Allies have no such intention. They do intend to beat Germany to a standstill and destroy the power of militarist Prussia to terrorize Europe—and in so far as this involves humiliation, to humiliate the German people. But the latter have humiliated themselves by their methods far more than any defeat after a brave fight could. Only the "peaceful penetration" of saner ideas can really accomplish the regeneration of the German character—a fair and generous settlement would pave the way for this—but force has a preliminary task to accomplish. It is the only thing which German militarist leaders in their present frame of mind can understand or to which they will yield. In the meantime it is absurd to talk of a premature peace. The Germans—although they do not admit it—seem to want such a peace now, and quite naturally. They must see that they miscalculated badly and began the war under unfavorable conditions. But is this any reason why the Allies should give them five or ten years' breathing-spell in which to recuperate with a view to seizing a more favorable opportunity later on? Five or ten years during which Europe would more than ever resemble an armed camp! I have no patience with the fatuous peace-lovers who fail to see by this time the significance of modern German ambitions—who cherish an amiable hope that, if let off now, the German ruling classes would undergo conversion and adopt the programme of a Chautauqua Conference. People who believe this sort of thing must be kept from doing mischief for the next six months, or, if necessary, six years. It would be treachery to the men who

have given their lives for the dream of a better Europe if the Allies were to listen for a moment to talk of a settlement until they have secured absolute guarantees—something more concrete than “scraps of paper”—that the present situation can never be repeated.

What Americans seem slow to realize is that two great systems of political thought—two civilizations—are face to face and striving for the mastery of the world as truly as they ever were at Marathon and Salamis, only on a larger scale. Do Americans want to do anything which would help the lower of these civilizations to triumph? If not, let them study the facts and realize the nature of the events through which we are passing. Without endangering the neutrality of the United States Government, they can throw their individual influence on the side of the higher civilization and see that the ring is kept open until a conclusive settlement is reached. I hope you feel this as strongly as I do.

Another matter on which there is no longer much room for doubt is the methods by which the Germans have been conducting the war. The third report of the Belgian commission of inquiry and the wanton destruction of Rheims Cathedral only put the finishing touches on the conviction which the accumulating reports of the earlier weeks must have forced on every thinking man and woman outside of Germany and Austria. Discount seventy-five per cent., if you wish, of the sworn statements sifted and vouched for by the distinguished men who composed the Belgian commission; disregard, even, all charges of misconduct on the part of individual German officers and soldiers, and there still remains the great mass of outrages *admitted by the German Government itself*, for which they are trying to make a feeble and hypocritical justification. These include the destruction in Louvain, Rheims

and numerous other places, the taking of hostages under pain of death (often inflicted) if their neighbors are guilty of even imaginary resistance, the wholesale shooting of unoffending non-combatants in revenge for isolated acts of resistance, the imposition of huge war indemnities on captured towns, the refusal to recognize non-uniformed civilian defenders of invaded districts as combatants, the scattering of mines broadcast in the North Sea which has already resulted in the destruction of property and loss of life to unoffending neutrals—in short, the whole systematic policy of terrorization.

And at first it was right for America to be skeptical about such charges, but (in spite of the reports of certain American correspondents who accompanied the German armies and were allowed to see only what the Germans wanted them to) skepticism is no longer possible in the face of the accumulating evidence.

Sheringham, September 23.

Dear A.:

I am reading hard, principally history and international politics, to get as complete a background as possible for the tremendous events we are going through. Few of us, I believe, realize how the world is likely to be transformed as the result of victory for the Allies. Lloyd George's splendid speech, which I enclose, suggests what such a victory may mean. Another article by Wells, of which I am sending a number of copies, suggests the duty of the United States to see to it that no reactionary forces control the final settlement and the new framework of European politics after the war. There *are* such forces even now at work—less in England than elsewhere, but nevertheless clearly marked—and unless they are counteracted, all the

immense loss and suffering of the war may bring a smaller result in solid permanent reconstruction than we have a right to hope for.

Dr. Eliot's fine letter in the "New York Times" has summed up the relics of medievalism in Europe that ought to be done away with: irresponsible diplomacy, swollen armaments, autocratic governments, and hostile groupings of the powers. The combined force of liberal opinion all over the world must be brought to bear at the settlement before the nations have slumped back into the old bad ways. I believe it will be, but I want to see my own country do her full part and realize her responsibility. I agree that it should be a carefully reasoned opinion, based on impartial study of the facts, and not on previously existing sentiments, racial ties or prejudice, and also that it should be expressed fairly and without bitterness. (The fact that German-American opinion has so little fulfilled these requirements probably explains very largely the President's attitude.) But the firm and vigorous expression of our opinion, subject to these conditions, seems to me not only legitimate but essential to the preservation of the standards and ideals in which we Americans believe with all our hearts. To remain indifferent and aloof with regard to such events as are taking place around us would be inhuman.

I hope that all Americans will see that any premature, inconclusive peace—the sort of peace for which already the German Government longs, although it dare not admit it—would be nothing short of a tragedy for the rest of the civilized world. The Hearsts and Champ Clarks—noble exponents of the best American thought!—may think first of the loss to American business or the German-American vote, or the sentimental appeal of any old kind of peace to well-intentioned and indiscriminating people—but I

hope that the mass of Americans will take a more far-sighted and disinterested view and will insist that the "ring be held" fairly and without ill-judged meddling until these two rival systems of thought and of life have settled their controversy thoroughly. This is what the Allies want and will insist upon—and what I say is, "More power to them!"

Sheringham, September 29th.

Dear K.:

I was much interested to hear that you want to go into the Russian-Austrian-Balkan end of things. I have sent you, during the last two weeks, a number of very valuable and interesting clippings on the present situation in Russia, an article from the "Daily Chronicle" by Harold Williams who is an expert on Russia, letters from Professor Vinogradoff, Bourtseff, and a number of other Russian liberals, and extracts from Russian newspapers. Also to-day an article from the "Chronicle" asserting the essentially non-aggressive character of the Russian national spirit and of Russian policy. I think it is mistaken as to the foreign policy of the Czars and the bureaucracy in Asia, especially between 1880 and 1905—but entirely right as to the spirit of the Russian people and the foreign policy of the Government in Europe with but few exceptions. Alexander II was an idealist and enthusiast, and the Russo-Turkish war was an immensely popular war in Russia, fought largely to free the Balkan Christians from Turkish misrule. It was Disraeli's wickedly misguided policy of backing Turkey (with the mistaken idea of protecting the route to India) which first aroused Russia's indignation and caused her for a generation to try and get square with England in Afghanistan and Manchuria: this, and the secret

treaty with the Sultan, first disclosed at the Berlin Conference of 1878, by which Disraeli secured the Island of Rhodes and the right to stand as protector of the Christians in Turkey—a right which England subsequently failed to make use of at the time of the Armenian massacres. England under Gladstone and Lord Salisbury reversed Disraeli's policy—you remember Salisbury's remark about England's having "backed the wrong horse"—but it wasn't until 1907 that the bad effect of her selfish, short-sighted policy began to be removed by the Anglo-Russian Entente.

I have gone into this because it partly justifies Russia's aggressiveness in Central Asia and explains the fears that England entertained of an invasion of India from the North. These fears were not ill-founded—Skobelev actually prepared plans for such an invasion—but the fact that Russia became such an awful bogey to England (she still is to some Englishmen) was chiefly due to England's own unjustifiable policy in the Near East, a policy which is now and was then bitterly condemned by the best English critics.

At the Berlin Congress in 1878 Bismarck and Disraeli got the best of Gortchakoff and upset the treaty of San Stefano which Russia had extorted from Turkey. At that time Bosnia and Herzegovina were put under an Austrian protectorate instead of being given to Serbia as Russia had planned. One of the great causes of Austro-Serbian bad feeling, therefore, was directly due to Austria's greed and to Bismarck's assistance. The Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, which Russia had assigned to Serbia, was handed back to Turkey—also the larger part of Bulgaria, a state created through Russian efforts, as Roumania and Serbia had been before.

Thus Russia's plan, which was similar to the result

which it is to be hoped will follow from the present war and the Balkan wars, was largely spoiled by the greed of Austria, who feared an increase in Slav influence, and by the selfish fears of England in connection with the route to India. Bismarck's help clinched the arrangement and forced Russia to agree to it against her will.

Mind you, I don't assert that Russia was wholly disinterested and magnanimous in her stand! She undoubtedly had designs on Constantinople (not an unjustifiable ambition, as it is partly due to her desire for a warm water port and to protect her Black Sea traffic, and partly to religious enthusiasm for replacing the Crescent on Sancta Sofia by the Cross). Greece possibly has the best claims to Constantinople and the East coast of the Ægean on the ground of history and existing interests, and I hope that she will get them now that the Young Turks have shown themselves so little of an improvement over the old régime; but Russian occupation would not, I believe, cause any of the evils that England used to fear, and if any other nation gets them, Russia ought to have special rights in the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. The immediate intention of occupying Constantinople at that time, however, was confined probably to some of the Grand Dukes and a few hot-heads. Alexander II had shown himself remarkably moderate and long-suffering between 1870 and 1878 and would hardly have allowed any rash action against the wishes of Western Europe.

Worse than any ambitions of this sort was Russia's treatment of Roumania, a nation which had helped her most generously and effectively in the war against Turkey. At the end of the war, Russia seized Bessarabia and "compensated" Roumanian feelings by a less valuable strip on the Bulgarian border. This inconceivably stupid and brutal action wiped out all the gratitude which Roumania had

felt toward Russia for her original liberation and threw the former into the arms of Austria—and subsequent efforts have hardly yet extricated her. If Russia wants to take the best means of securing Roumania's help in the present war, she will offer her not only the Roumanian populations of Transylvania and Bukowina (at Austria's expense!), but also Bessarabia. She may have made this offer—at any rate, it looks now as if Roumania would declare war against Austria at any time.

Another instance of selfish stupidity on Russia's part was her treatment of Bulgaria after 1878, which, as in the case of Roumania, wiped out for a long time any gratitude on Bulgaria's part. Alexander III, who succeeded Alexander II in 1881, was a very different type of man—narrow, autocratic, reactionary; as industrious and as stupid as George III. He determined to make Russian influence control in Bulgaria and to keep the country under a sort of Russian protectorate. With this purpose he determined that the annexation of Eastern Roumelia, long contemplated by the Bulgarians, should be brought about, not by their own action, but by Russia, so that they might be still further bound to her. He filled Sofia with Russian agents, bullied Alexander of Battenberg, and did everything to make the liberty-loving Bulgarians hate the very name of Russia. Gradually Alexander of Battenberg was brought into closer sympathy with the Bulgarian liberals, of whom Stambuloff was the very able leader, and finally, in 1885, Eastern Roumelia was suddenly annexed by them without so much as a "by-your-leave" to Alexander III. The latter was naturally furious and determined to get his revenge. With the aid of Austria, he egged on Serbia, then under Austrian influence, to attack Bulgaria, but contrary to all expectations, Bulgaria gained a smashing victory (very much as in 1913, when Austria per-

suaded Bulgaria to attack Serbia, Serbia utterly surprised her by winning!). Alexander III then set to work to undermine his too independent namesake's influence in his own capital, and finally, by means of an artificially stirred-up revolution, had him kidnapped and exiled—one of the most disgraceful episodes in all modern history.

Alexander of Battenberg later returned in triumph, but through Russian trickery and his own discouragement at Russian opposition, was finally led to abdicate. Stambuloff, however, remained in power. Ferdinand, the new Prince, proved little more tractable than his predecessor, and, for all his intrigues, Alexander III only succeeded in rendering Bulgaria more defiantly independent than ever.

Even during these years, however, when he was doing so much to make Russia distrusted in the Balkans, Alexander III pursued a cautious policy toward the Western nations in general, and was anything but dangerously aggressive—in *the West*. In the East, his generals, following up Russia's long-continued expansion in this direction and with a special new incentive now to get square with England, pushed their conquests over all Turkestan up to the borders of Afghanistan and Persia. His successor, the present Czar, has continued the policy of expansion, but in the Far East rather than in Central Asia. His high-handed action in Manchuria, his joint protest with Germany and France against Japan's seizure of Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula after the Chinese war, his subsequent seizure of Port Arthur himself (under guise of a lease from China, Germany immediately taking Kiau Chau on a slender pretext by way of compensation), and his whole unscrupulous policy of expansion at the expense of China and Japan (a policy in which he was egged on and accompanied by Germany), was finally brought to an end by Russia's defeat at the hands of Japan in 1904.

Since then has come the Anglo-Russian Entente and a Russo-Japanese "understanding," and Russia's policy in recent years has turned its face to the westward again—though not in any aggressive way. It is only since her attempt to keep Russia busy outside of Europe failed that Germany has come to dread the "Russian peril"!

But Nicholas, especially during the first ten years of his reign preceding the Japanese war, has also been guilty of another very unjust and outrageous policy toward the subject races in his own Empire, especially the Finns and Poles. It was at the instigation of Prussia that Poland was originally dismembered; it has been under Prussian influence, and with the example of Prussia's treatment of her own Polish subjects, that Russia has pursued her "nationalizing" policy of crushing out the national characteristics, languages and independence of her non-Russian citizens, and it does not lie in the mouth of any Prussian statesman, in view of Prussia's conduct in her own Eastern provinces, to utter any reproach!

The treatment of the Jews is even less defensible than the treatment of Finland and Poland—that must certainly be admitted without question. But to my mind this is rather irrelevant to the general issue as between *Russia and Germany*. It is a mere taunt with which Germany seeks to bolster up an otherwise weak case, by creating (just) prejudice against Russia, and a taunt which bids fair, before long, under English and French influence in Russia, to become obsolete and undeserved. The real issue is not whether Russian governmental policy and Russian "culture" are of a higher or lower type than those of Germany, but whether German "culture" and Germany's political power and prestige were in any danger of being attacked or overwhelmed by Russian aggression. It is on the latter charge (that they were in such danger) that

Germany has sought to defend her own and Austria's action in the present crisis. Any such assertion can rather easily be shown to be ridiculous—so to bolster up her argument and confuse the issue, Germany begins abusing Russia on general grounds and instituting unfavorable comparisons with her own pre-eminent cultural attainments! (As a matter of fact, though it is irrelevant, I believe that Russian "culture" is more truly Christian and more truly civilized in its essential inner spirit than that of *modern* Germany! The real trouble is that in neither country recently has its best "culture" succeeded in controlling the action of the Government.)

My whole summary of recent history (I rather apologize for making it so long, but I have been going over all this ground quite carefully, and I don't know any one book where you would find just such a summary in brief or unconfused form) is intended to show that Russia's European policy for thirty years past has not been such as to cause any of the larger Western nations any just anxiety or to lay her open (with the exceptions above noted) to the charge of aggressiveness.

Let me now go back for a moment to the Balkans. Austrian influence was predominant, on the whole, in Serbia up to 1907 or 1908, though the fall of the Obrenovitch dynasty dealt it a heavy blow about 1903. What forever finished it was Austria's annexation, against all fairness and international law, of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, with the help of Germany. This one act, with its accompanying insult to Russia, is one of the main underlying causes of the present war. If it is possible to discover in it any evidence of Russian "aggression," I should be glad to have this pointed out! The aggression, indisputably, was all on the other side. Austria has within her borders nearly thirty million Slavs whom, with the recent excep-

tion of the Poles in Galicia, she has been treating abominably and almost all of whom are eager to throw off her yoke. She has bitterly resented every extension of Russian influence in the Balkans, and every sign of growth in independence and vigor of the Balkan nations, because she has been constantly afraid of losing her own Slav subjects. One can easily understand her point of view, but it is very hard to have any *sympathy* with it. Just as she now opposes Slav freedom and union (which would be partly at her expense), so she opposed Italian freedom and union (also partly at her expense) fifty years ago—but the world rightly sympathized with Italy, not with an essentially tyrannical, reactionary, ramshackle, artificial empire, whose only real unity was, and still is, dynastic. Germany sides with Austria for racial reasons and because of her keen ambition to secure Germanic control of the Balkans with a view to the more complete political conquest of Asia Minor (which she now largely controls economically). Russia's sympathy for the independence of the small Slav nations of the Balkans and her desire to protect her Black Sea outlet and also the Greek Christians in Turkey, constitute a stumbling-block in the way of these ambitions—but as between racial sympathy and desire to protect an undeniable economic interest on the one hand, and dreams of expansion involving the domination of alien races on the other, which should command the sympathy and support of neutral nations to the greater extent? Which is the more justifiable, the more consistent with modern ideas? Which can more honestly be termed aggressive? Also, in what way does Russia's support of the Balkan Slavs threaten German "*culture*" or German independence? German *ambitions*, indeed, may be interfered with—but can one wish that these ambitions should succeed *at the expense of the Balkan nations*? It may be

said that Russia in the past has threatened the independence of these Balkan States—but if her idea is to dominate them, why does she seek, not to keep them small and weak and divided, as do Germany and Austria, but to enlarge and strengthen them in accordance with their own wishes?—especially, knowing as she does from experience, that the stronger they grow the more they will resent external interference, even from a kindred great power. Finally, which influence—Russian or Austrian—do the Balkan States themselves fear more? They resent any outside interference, no doubt, but there is also little question that, as between Russia and Austria, they have less to fear from the former (especially Serbia).

No—the German bogey of Russian aggression, of a danger to European civilization, simply won't hold water! Just as, when the Kaiser was shamelessly robbing Japan and China, he beat the tom-tom to the tune of the "Yellow Peril," so now, when he and his Austrian ally want to gain ground in Southwestern Europe at the expense of the Slav races, he raises a howl about the "Russian Peril"! One warning is about as justifiable as the other. Both are designed only to distract attention from his own designs.

The only really aggressive "culture" to-day, the only one that despises the culture of all other nations and threatens to extend its influence by armed force, is that of Germany. Even some of the best exponents of German "culture" seem to have a competitive conception of it, seem to regard it as "threatened" by the development of any other brand of "culture." Isn't it generally true that the man (or the nation) which is constantly dreading attack and imputing to others an intention of injuring him, is the one who himself harbors the notion of injuring others, and who is conscious of having given others reason to distrust him?

An able Russian liberal has recently said that, at bottom, this war is a struggle between the "free, organic, democratic imperialism of the English type" (which he holds as a model for Russia in future: the type based on voluntary union between self-governing commonwealths) and "the barrack-room imperialism of Germany." Is n't this a truer description of the real issue than the German "Slav barbarism *versus* Teuton culture" description?

Sheringham, October 2nd.

Dear K.:

I did n't really have time to finish my last letter—I had to leave part of my argument about Russia hanging in mid-air, and I can't remember just now how much I got down on paper and how much was still in my head, as I was writing at top speed toward the end. I think, however, that I finished most of my main points.

I sent you with the last lot of clippings a splendid article on Russia by the same "Politicus" who wrote the article on the Kaiser's personal responsibility for the war, in the September "Fortnightly." It ought to reach you about the same time as this letter. This article reviews the Russo-German relations for the last century, covering, however, very little of the same ground which I covered in my last letter, and it shows most convincingly the strong influence toward a reactionary, repressive policy which Prussia had exercised for years, up till quite recently, on the Russian court and bureaucracy. Indeed, this bureaucracy has actually been, to a very large extent, German. The vices peculiar to such Prussianized bureaucracy are by no means characteristic of the Russian nation. Russians are liable to sudden, emotional relapse into savagery, and this national tendency in connection with a highly system-

atized, cast-iron administration, utterly unsympathetic to the national habits and temperament of the Slav, has produced many of the worst abuses for which the Russian Government has been responsible—abuses which an equally rigid administration has not produced (at any rate to anything like the same degree) among the more docile, phlegmatic Germans. Some one has recently said that the vices of Russians are those of a young growing nation just shaking itself free from the last vestiges of barbarism. They are faults of immaturity, and, as I have argued above, for many of the faults of its Government the Russian nation is not to blame. The faults of the Germans, on the other hand, are those of a race, in most directions, highly civilized—one which has turned aside from its best traditions and exalted that side of its development which was at best an unfortunate necessity into a national ideal. Their faults are essentially vices of the 18th century, reinforced by the whole external paraphernalia of 20th-century civilization. Along with these are some vices peculiar to the 20th century, with which we in the United States have had to fight: commercialism, brutal materialism, and the other qualities which accompany a too sudden and overwhelming business prosperity.

These vices of modern Germany, carried to the extent to which she has carried them, seem to me far more dangerous to the rest of the world than those from which Russia is emerging. What is more, the mass of the Germans seem to love these characteristic vices of theirs, while the mass of the Russians are ashamed of the excesses of their Government. What Vinogradoff said of Bernhardt is illuminating on this point. Another of the clippings which I sent you points out that the eyes of all of the progressive elements of Russia are more and more turned to England. I do not think it is mere facile optimism to

believe that this new influence of English example will be a powerful force during the next generation when the two nations have become for the first time really friendly and intimate.

Before I began reading Tolstoy, Tourgénéieff, Dostoievsky and Tcheckoff, I felt a very strong prejudice against Russia, a good deal of which I can now trace back to one or two of Kipling's stories and to various articles in English reviews. No one, however, could read Dostoievsky's "Crime and Punishment" or Tolstoy's "Resurrection" or many of Tourgénéieff's stories without being impressed with their intense feeling for justice and mercy and brotherliness, or without coming to love the men who wrote them and the people about whom they were written. If these books are in any way true to the real character of the Russian nation—and surely one can assume that they are true to a considerable extent at least—then Europe need have little fear of any such organized, ruthless aggression from Russia as that for which Germany now stands. Even the other side of Russian life, as shown in a book like Dostoievsky's "The Brothers Karamazoff," rouses little fear of this particular danger.

The Germans have the right, logically speaking, to reproach Russia with her pogroms, her Siberian prisons and other extreme abuses of this sort—but they have *no* right, in view of their own utterly unsympathetic and repressive treatment of Alsace-Lorraine and their Polish provinces, to reproach Russia with her attempt to denationalize her subject races, the Finns, Poles, Lithuanians and Little Russians. This false national policy, undertaken some fifteen or twenty years ago by the present Czar, is not likely to last long after the war. In the action of India, South Africa and the other English colonies, Russia will have before her eyes a brilliant example of the results of the

opposite policy—and Sir Edward Grey may be trusted, I believe, to emphasize the lesson. The new feeling of friendliness, unity and national enthusiasm in Russia itself ought also to facilitate the adoption of a fair and liberal policy for the future.

There are several recent incidents which you ought to keep in mind in connection with the review of Balkan history which I gave in my last letter. I meant to mention them then, but did n't have time. Since the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina permanently embittered the Serbians, Austria has tried hard in every way to injure Serbia and reduce her to a helpless position. Also she has maltreated and repressed her own Croato-Serbian subjects—though the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, if he had lived, would probably have worked hard to secure for them such generous treatment as would in time have reconciled them to their position in the Dual Monarchy. According to the confession of the German official "White Paper" itself, it was largely the success of Serbia in the two Balkan wars which aroused the fears of both Austria and Germany. In short, these two countries had managed to manœuvre themselves into a position where, according to their own opinion at least, their future "safety" depended on their crushing and reducing to subserviency a sturdy, patriotic, intensely independent little nation—not an anarchic half-barbarous Asiatic or African country (like Persia, for example), but a rapidly developing, civilized, efficient State with a peculiarly strong national consciousness and a really great history. I don't think it is any exaggeration to say that Southern Italy and Sicily in 1859-61 were more backward, more open to just disparagement in many ways, than is Serbia to-day. Yet one of the few acts for which Napoleon III was most deservedly praised was his coming to the assistance of Piedmont against

Austria on behalf of a united Italy—and France is far less closely related racially to Italy than Russia to Serbia. Why then was it an act of wicked aggression for Russia this year to step in and prevent the subjugation of her weaker relative—especially when she did so after urging that relative to go to the very limit of submissiveness in accepting demands confessedly so framed as to be unacceptable?

The general contrast between Russia's Balkan policy and that of the two Germanic nations seems to me too strong to need further emphasis. . . .

I was much interested in what you said in your last letter as to the instinctive distrust of Germany so widely felt in the United States. I think you are quite right that such a feeling existed, and was all ready to spring to life at even a small provocation. Americans in general were not sufficiently interested in European politics, or sufficiently informed in regard to them, to form any clearly reasoned opinion as to the character and probable result of Germany's recent ambitions, but a number of incidents, small in themselves, though sufficient when taken together, had aroused irritation and disapproval and had left behind them a half-conscious distrust. As soon as the facts in regard to the present crisis began to be known, this feeling developed into a clear-cut, reasoned condemnation of Germany's action—but even before this, the first instinctive reaction was all against her, the old distaste and suspicion flared out spontaneously. Certainly there was never a better instance of a nation's being unable, even by the most patient efforts (for instance, Prince Henry's visit after the Spanish war), to escape the consequences of its past misdeeds. I imagine the Zabern incident last winter did nothing to lessen America's feeling! . . .

One good result of the war will be the education of

American opinion in regard to European politics,—the awakening of the great mass of Americans to a better-informed interest in matters outside their own country.

Sheringham, October 6th.

Dear K.:

What you say about keeping an "open mind" I absolutely sympathize with—but as to the most important Belgian atrocities, it seems to me that the well established facts leave no room for further suspension of judgment. No doubt there has been much exaggeration in the stories of individual acts by German soldiers, but these are relatively unimportant—some such acts are almost invariably committed by large armies, and in regard to them there is always exaggeration. What is almost a new thing, however, and a far more dangerous return to barbarism, is the systematic policy of terrorization pursued by the German higher commanders with a brutality unequalled for centuries past, and defended or extenuated with a mixture of falsehood or mere appeal to some fancied "military necessity." As to this, it is difficult to speak too harshly or sweepingly!

The conduct of the British in South Africa *was* open to a good deal of criticism, but their offences (for which there was far more "military necessity" than there ever has been in Belgium) were confined to the burning of farm-houses, and even this policy was postponed until all other means of ending guerilla warfare had failed. They "concentrated" the non-combatants in huge camps toward the end of the war, but they never shot down women and children, nor killed scores of men for an attack upon them by one or two hot-heads. Their whole military law as to civilian resistance is very different.

Dr. Eliot's two letters have been splendid, particularly the last. Dernburg's answer is misleading and tricky, and there is no escaping the conclusion that it is intentionally so. His whole correspondence with Fosdick showed the same untrustworthiness and deliberate attempt to create a false impression. In this answer to Dr. Eliot he says that, while Belgium was nominally neutral, all her defensive preparations were directed against Germany, and that she was secretly hand in glove with France and England. The latter statement is mere unfounded assertion. The former, which seems to back up this assertion and make it more plausible, omits to mention that for years past Germany has been building miles of railway near the Belgian border, with huge platforms only suitable for detraining armies and their equipment—railways and platforms which had no *economic* but only a military justification. They were useless for any purpose except an invasion of France through Belgium. Also for years past, numerous German military writers have been openly proclaiming Germany's intention of making use of this route, and all her system of mobilization was based upon this intention. In view of these incontestable facts, naturally Belgium fortified herself on the side on which she was threatened. Her only mistake was that she delayed her preparations too long—a few years hence they would have been more complete! France had almost no fortifications on her Belgian border, and absolutely no such system of strategic railways leading to it. Both she and Belgium trusted Germany's word! The whole attempt by Germany to confuse the issue as to her violation of the Belgian treaty is a tissue of lies and misstatements, made up recently since she has seen the effect which her action had upon the opinion of the whole world. The *truth* is what the Chancellor and

von Jagow told the British Ambassador in Berlin, and what the former told the Reichstag.

Equally absurd are Dernburg's statements denying the existence of "militarism" in Germany and the autocratic control by the Kaiser (in practice) of foreign affairs and his complete control of military matters, and asserting that England's control of the sea is a greater danger to the United States than any increase in German power! England's maritime position has altered little for decades past and will not be greatly altered if she wins in this war. How has that position of hers ever injured us? The characteristic thing about her whole policy since the early part of the 19th century—except for her relations to savage or backward races in Asia and Africa—has been its lack of aggressiveness toward other powers and its recognition of the rights of other powers. Also its steady maintenance of free trade has given other nations almost as much benefit from its colonies as it has derived itself.

Sheringham, October 8th.

Dear K.:

I was interested in the articles by Roosevelt which you sent and agree with you entirely. While most of his deductions from the war are undoubtedly true, I believe his emphasis is wrong. He is, it seems to me, in many ways "progressive," but is not consistently "liberal." The present Liberal party in England has added its social "progressivism" to a solid foundation of sturdy liberal principles; merely correcting the excessively individualistic character which liberalism developed early in the 19th century, and expanding its basic doctrines to fit the facts of 20th-century life. (Read Hobhouse's "Liberalism" if you want to get a good idea how it has done this.)

But liberalism applies to the foreign policy of a nation as well as to its internal affairs. What it means in this field of foreign policy could hardly be better set forth than in "Democracy and Reaction," which was written as a protest against the Unionist policy that led to the Boer war. (In some ways, however, I think that policy was justified in South Africa, though not the political theories that accompanied and were used to justify it.) If progressivism in America is to become the force which I hope it will, it must see that its doctrines are preached, not at the expense of, but in addition to, the sound old tested principles of liberalism as developed in centuries of English constitutional struggles. It must make *all* the planks in its platform sound and mutually consistent. Anything more absurd and contradictory than a progressive policy at home and a Jingo policy in foreign affairs can hardly be imagined. It is only because foreign affairs are such a closed book to most Americans—because they are so poorly informed and so unaccustomed to think thoroughly or systematically about them—that this contradiction is not more clearly perceived. It disgusts English Liberals, and in general has blinded them to Roosevelt's real merits and attainments. Gladstone taught *them* liberalism in foreign affairs—or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that John Bright and Cobden and the "philosophical liberals" taught both Gladstone and the Liberal party. We have not yet learned the lesson. We vacillate between Jingoism on the one hand and sentimental pacificism on the other. But we are learning, and this war, I hope, will mark a stride forward in our intelligent grasp of foreign problems and of the sound principles which should underlie international relations. Of course experience has been England's great teacher; we have n't had this advantage.

Where Roosevelt is right is in asserting that no policy of

mere disarmament is safe or wise as long as some nations cherish medieval standards of national conduct and medieval ambitions. Norman Angell admits this frankly, though it seems to me that his recent criticisms of Sir Edward Grey recognize the fact insufficiently. No group of *individuals* would deprive themselves of the means of self-defence if one or more of their number were (to take an extreme illustration) criminal maniacs or if they openly announced their belief in treachery and robbery. To urge indiscriminate disarmament is merely to render pacificism ridiculous. Disarmament and pacific relations between nations, as between individuals, depend upon and presuppose the attainment by *all* the members of a given group of at least an approximately similar stage of political development, or else upon the agreement of a strong majority among them to unite in suppressing any backward members of the group who threaten its security. The latter ideal, of course, is the one aimed at by most thoughtful liberals in the present situation in Europe, but it is difficult of attainment, and could not, I believe, have been secured by the single efforts of Sir Edward Grey prior to the war. This is where Norman Angell, like Ramsay Macdonald (though in a far less unfair and offensive way), has been mistaken in his criticisms of English foreign policy under the present Liberal Government—*i.e.*, since the end of 1905. He has asked the impossible and has blamed Sir Edward Grey bitterly, and, as I believe, unjustly, for adopting the policy of defensive alliances instead of striving to create a "concert of the powers." Sir Edward Grey *has* striven for this latter object, and Asquith's Cardiff speech showed that he has done so, and how and why the effort failed. In protecting England, meanwhile, by the only possible method—*i.e.*, the Triple Entente—from a danger openly threatened, Sir Edward

Grey was taking the only safe and patriotic course, it seems to me. To refuse to admit this, and to persist in rather bitter criticism, is hardly what I should have expected from Norman Angell—and it is bound to injure his future influence in England. His constructive work, looking to the future, I heartily sympathize with—but it would be quite possible for him to take the position of urging certain policies to follow the war, without blaming Sir Edward Grey for failing to secure them before the war. Also, I think there is just a suspicion, in his recent writings and those of his followers, of the “holier-than-thou” attitude which is so often the bane of reformers—a tendency to overlook the possibility that people of quite different views—even Tories—might agree with many of his aims; and to speak a little as if the whole salvation of Europe depended on the Norman Angell movement. This tendency, though very slight, naturally irritates the conservative people, even those who agree with much that N. A. advocates. You know from my letter to Mrs. J. what I think of the expediency at this time of any organized propaganda from men whose criticisms of Sir Edward Grey have strongly prejudiced the public against them. The more important the object, the less they ought to risk injuring it now in this way. They should have some confidence in their fellow-Liberals and Laborites, and realize that not *all* of England, outside their group, has fallen a victim to “Prussianism.”

Of course, the whole “defense” argument can be readily perverted into the very fallacious and entirely distinct theory that armaments prevent wars—or it can be exaggerated and misused as Roosevelt has misused it. It is an argument which is applicable only in exceptional cases, such as that of Europe in the last forty years. Where nations are reasonably advanced in their development (and

not undergoing temporary pathological reactions!) the argument hardly applies at all. In the case of the United States it applies only slightly. We need a reasonably strong navy, I believe, but certainly not any panicky resort to militarism. On the other hand, it is an argument which cannot be wholly neglected in the present condition of the world. If the advocates of disarmament had had their way in England recently, where would she be now? All nations must agree to disarm at the same time; and if one or more treat such proposals as England has twice made to Germany in recent years as merely an indication of cowardice or treachery, and proceed, as Germany actually did, to speed up their military preparations, then disarmament for any one of the group becomes an impossibility.

In fact the peace movement is essentially a matter of education—of the propagation of a sounder view, particularly in those countries which regard forcible aggression as a legitimate object of their policy. Until they can be converted, or restrained by force, the social development of the other nations will necessarily be retarded. This is why Germany must be beaten in this war; though the only hope of a permanently satisfactory arrangement lies in her conversion—not in mere forcible restraint. The fact that her Government has had to persuade its citizens that the war is a “defensive” one, and that the other nations, not Germany, are the peace-breakers, in order to gain their united support, shows that a great many Germans are peace-loving and could be converted to a proper attitude toward other nations. What is at fault with them, as their uncritical acceptance of their Government’s assertions shows, is not so much their lack of peacefulness as a striking and fatal lack of political discernment—of any power of independent criticism. Also, the propaganda carried on among them for years has certainly converted a great

many, including those who carry the most weight and control the Government, to an utterly barbarous attitude toward their neighbors (see on this point a book by Bourdon called "What the Germans Think"; also, the leading article in the "Times" literary supplement which I am sending you to-day). It seems to me that Norman Angell and his fellow-critics of the English Government fail to give due weight to the known record of the German Government and to its action before and during the present war. They also overlook the remarkable manifestos which are being issued by leading Germans. Read the last issue of "War and Peace" and see if you don't agree with me. There is a slight tendency to regard the Germans as injured innocents and to blame the brutal British press for its attitude toward them. Now, I don't defend exaggeration and blind hatred and reliance upon a mere forcible "crushing" of Germany, nor do I approve of the exaction, later on, of excessively harsh terms. But it seems to me absurd to overlook all the gross faults of the German Government and nation and blame the far less guilty English Government and nation—and this, to a considerable extent, is what "War and Peace" seems to do. Let criticism begin at home, if you will,—that is healthy enough,—but at least be fair and state the facts accurately. The average Englishman reading "War and Peace" merely feels its unfairness, and the effect it has is to make him boiling mad and to destroy any influence which the magazine might exert. There is the clearest evidence of just this result in the whole public press, even among the more moderate papers, and I can't find them wholly to blame at a time like this, if their replies to the Norman Angell group are bitter and unfair. It is hard these days to keep one's balance and see both sides, but I really *do* try—in spite of occasional lapses when I read some of the reports from

Belgium or the German "explanations"! I must stop now—but I hope to have given you a reasonably fair and complete statement of my attitude toward the peace movement, which I think was what you wanted.

Sheringham, October 12th.

Dear M.:

I have been reading lately some of the literature issued by the Pan-German League, and more virulent, poisonous rubbish you never saw. This League is composed chiefly of ex-army and navy officers, financiers, commercial leaders who see fabulous riches in an enlarged colonial empire and control of the sea, armament manufacturers, journalists and professors. A large majority of the school-teachers in the country belong to it and preach its doctrines to their pupils. It controls almost completely the "Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung," the "Tägliche Rundschau," the "Reichspost" and the "Kreuz-Zeitung"—all of which are leading newspapers which you probably know by name. Other papers, like the "Kölnische Zeitung," "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten" and the "Tageblatt," are more or less under its influence, and print a lot of its stuff. A great many university professors preach its doctrines, and a host of speakers and pamphleteers keep its propaganda constantly before the public. No wonder the docile, politically unsophisticated Germans readily swallow the poison, especially as all the teaching which they get in schools, if not actually colored by Pan-Germanism, is at least of a character which rather predisposes them to its views.

No other European nation, so far as I know, has ever permitted such a propaganda, openly directed against the liberty of half a dozen friendly neighboring States, to be carried on not only with impunity but with its tacit ap-

proval. Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, the late foreign minister, was quoted by a witness under oath in a court of law as having said to him (the witness was an agent of the Pan-German League): "I am as good a Pan-German as you are"! The League has often been too strong for the Government, even when the latter has tried faint-heartedly to curb some of its worst excesses. It was the League's influence, really, which raised such a hornets' nest about the Kaiser's ears for his pro-English interview in 1908, and which enabled a member of the Reichstag to openly refer to him as a "poltroon" after the failure of the Agadir coup in 1911.

In view of the activity of this League and its allied organizations, such as the Navy League, and the enormous success which they have had (it was they who backed up Dernburg's campaign for a "bürgerliche" majority in 1906 and gave the Socialists the only bad beating they have had in many years), it is absurd for the Germans to refer to themselves as "peaceful." Why, pamphlets issued by the League openly advocated seizing a great strip of France stretching from Toulon and Marseilles to Calais and Boulogne, driving out all the French inhabitants (in order to avoid the troubles which Alsace-Lorraine has given), and settling this territory with German colonists! Other publications demand the annexation of Belgium, Holland and Denmark, and the formation of a great central European federation under the leadership and control of Germany, stretching from the Baltic to the Ægean and on through Asia Minor to Persia! This literature is full of envy, hatred and malice toward almost all the other nations, of lies about their history and present condition, and of sweeping assertions as to the superiority of German "culture" to that of all other races and the duty of imposing it upon them by the sword! A more utterly damnable

and pernicious set of political teachings you could not imagine. I had some notion of this when I was in Germany, but I never fully realized it until I began reading up on the subject. There can be no security or progress in Western Europe until this festering sore has been cut out of German life by a very drastic surgical operation!

Sheringham, October 12th.

Dear L.:

Nowadays, of course, the one thing that one is interested in is the war. There are a great many territorials stationed all along the coast for home defense, one wing of the hotel being occupied by a company of engineers. They have been digging trenches and putting the whole coast in a state to withstand a possible German raid. At night no lights are allowed to be shown in the town on the side of the North Sea. The other morning early all the troops near here were suddenly called out to "man the trenches," to give them practice at the operation. No one expects invasion, but it is realized that armed raids are quite possible and may be attempted.

I have talked quite a bit with the officers stationed here, and they are all keen to be sent to the front. Most of them probably will be when they have had some training. A few have gone to France already to reinforce the "expeditionary army," and others have replaced garrisons in Malta, Egypt and elsewhere, releasing them for active service. The men whistle and sing wherever they go, and are a most jolly, good-natured and likable lot—all of them very fit and serviceable-looking. Every person one meets has friends or relatives in the army, and many are already in mourning. The nation has taken the crisis most wonderfully and goes quietly and cheerfully about its business

—except for the very large number of people who are connected in one way or another with military preparations or with relief work. Recruiting goes on as fast as the War Office can handle the new men and provide them with officers (non-commissioned officers), the crying need at present, and equipment. Over 600,000 of the new army, in addition to some 900,000 regulars, reserves and territorials, are already organized and in training. The Government expects them to be ready by early spring—perhaps before. This number will be raised to 1,000,000 or possibly 2,000,000 before the war is over. Germany is certain to be beaten in the long run, but no one expects it to be a short or easy job—and no one will be contented until it is done, and done thoroughly. The menace of armed aggression must be put an end to once and for all.

Sheringham, October 13th.

Dear K.:

I have been thinking a bit more about what I wrote you as to the Progressive party. The Progressive party's job, it seems to me, has been to socialize and adapt to modern needs the too individualistic liberalism of Jefferson's and Jackson's time. But it must also develop and round out American liberal theory, which has never received the systematic, philosophical exposition and development which English liberalism received from men like Cobden, Bright and Mill, particularly the latter; who, by the way, became strikingly more socialized in his point of view toward the end of his life. We have never developed a clear, consistent, comprehensive set of liberal principles which could be applied to any new political problems that might arise. The English Liberal party has done this only imperfectly, but it has done it to a far

greater extent than we; and English Liberals are much more thorough and consistent in their liberalism than most American liberals.

The old individualistic, *laissez faire* liberalism has been largely perverted to the selfish benefit of the capitalistic middle class, the manufacturing and commercial interests—as the Socialists long ago (before 1850) perceived and pointed out. This has not been a phenomenon by any means confined to the United States, though the evil there was slower in being recognized, and attained in the meantime a more aggravated form than in other countries. In Austria, as Wickham Steed points out, the Jewish bankers and business leaders from the third quarter of the 19th century on developed very much the same sort of economic tyranny as that which we have seen in the last decade at home; and defended themselves politically by false appeals to “liberal” principles (just as our own business men have done, supported by thinkers like Nicholas Murray Butler), until they made the very word “liberalism” hated in their country. The result in Austria was the rise of a strong “Christian Socialist” party under the leadership of Dr. Lueger, a man who, in his vigorous opportunism, tinged with a certain appreciation of the Socialist viewpoint, was curiously analogous to Roosevelt. The party was neither very “Christian” nor very “Socialist”—it was clerical, anti-Semitic and paternalist—a more curious hodge-podge than our own Progressive party. But, like our Progressive party, it was probably the best available compromise at the moment and accomplished a good deal of solid work.

What has been impressed on me lately, however, is that we ought not to let the Nicholas Murray Butlers, with their early 19th-century conception of “liberalism,” make us hate the true essential doctrine of liberalism as the Aus-

trian pseudo-liberal party made that nation hate what they had come to understand by the word, *i.e.*, mere exemption for a privileged class from necessary governmental regulation in the interest of the whole community. German efficiency and centralized control has been a good deal in the mind of modern social reformers as an antidote to this pseudo-liberalism, the hatefulness of which has been peculiarly emphasized in America by the immense economic development of the latter part of the 19th century. This "State Socialism" of Germany (if I am right in using this term) has brought with it many of the advantages which a more democratic Socialism offered and advocated—but it has also developed to a very great extent the vices which the opponents of all forms of Socialism have never tired of attacking. They have used the faults of German bureaucratic social reform as a welcome argument against any kind of social reform—and in reply, the progressive-minded people have had a tendency to defend not only social reform as the best and most democratic of its advocates conceived it, but also, quite unnecessarily, the more extreme forms of *State* regulation which German example seemed to prove desirable. Now that we are beginning to see more clearly what this development of bureaucratic control over the life of the nation has meant in Germany, it seems to me that we ought to be on our guard against paying too high a price for social efficiency—against purchasing social reform at the expense of the old, tested advantages of liberalism. It would n't do us much good to jump from the pseudo-liberalism that emphasized too much the liberty of the individual "to do what he damn pleased" to a pseudo-socialism that denied the right of free self-development and destroyed the healthy variety and initiative which the best English liberal thinkers have had in mind. I am afraid that we should find this

fire far worse than the frying-pan! I certainly would prefer even our unregulated American system of twenty years ago to the more efficient but less sound and healthy system of modern Germany. The inner rottenness and bankruptcy which the German system is now exhibiting must be a warning to us to develop our progressivism and social reform in harmony with true liberalism and democracy.

Of course, it would be absurd to lay the blame for German militarism, political ambitions, and social degeneracy at the door of German administrative centralization and efficient governmental control. All that one need conclude from recent events is that *excessive* control by the State of the education and daily life of its citizens has a dangerous tendency to expose these citizens to poisonous influence, which under a freer political system would have less chance to grow or do harm. It checks their freedom of development and prevents independent thinking and criticism, however much it increases their immediate well-being and efficiency. The social environment produced by English and American historical development, for all the faults which an insufficient "sense of the State" and absence of intelligent central control have exposed it, is at any rate a far healthier, sounder environment than that in which the rank weeds of "Pan-Germanism" and "militarism" have flourished so astonishingly. I don't believe that, even if the historical background and geographical situation in England and America had been as unfortunate as those of poor Germany, we should even then have undergone the disastrous demoralization which efficient, "model-governed" Germany has undergone in the last forty years.

All this makes one look back with a new feeling of sympathy and discriminating admiration to the English tradi-

tion of free institutions and individual liberty—in spite of the faults which this traditional system has at times developed. These were chiefly because of its insufficient recognition of other political ideals besides “liberty.” We have been too ready, perhaps, to think of the constitutional struggles of the 17th century and the revolutions achieved by Adam Smith, Bentham and Cobden as of little importance to us nowadays. We have been too apt to remember the narrowness of the conception of liberty for which these men fought so successfully—its inadequate application to the great mass of modern wage-earners—and to forget what an enormous gain it represented over the political tyranny and the fussy, ill-conceived meddling with the economic life of the nation against which these earlier reformers protested. We must maintain the continuity of our progress, and go on to new reforms without losing the benefit of those won for us by our forefathers.

To the extent that they preach this valuable lesson, which perhaps some of us were in danger of forgetting, men like Nicholas Murray Butler (I keep coming back to him as a type) have been doing a useful and genuinely “conservative” work. Only—because they were right in this, they were not necessarily right in defending the faults and inadequacies of traditional liberalism; nor need we stop working for the further developments of liberalism which are already being achieved in England, and which we so need in our own country.

It would be an extremely interesting thing if some man like Giddings or Ross would make a sociological study of the German nation and show just how far their present grave faults are the result of their unfortunate political history for centuries past,—of their lack of that training in living considerately and “gently” (*i.e.*, like gentlefolk) among themselves and with their neighbors, to which the

absence of any national unity has condemned them. I imagine that the pre-eminent development of just these social-political virtues among the English and French has been due, as much as to anything, to the very early period at which these two peoples became unified under a strong central Government and began to develop a real national life. One feels so strongly in the Germans that lack of any recognition of the rights of others—any ability to understand other points of view and sympathize with them—which is noticeable in an undisciplined child, a child which has not knocked about enough with other children to develop a satisfactory *modus vivendi*. Certainly historical “chance” has had something to do with German failings, as it has with English success, in these directions—but that is no reason why they should not now be taught better! One may make excuses for an undisciplined child, but, for the sake of others, one can’t spare it the unavoidable consequences of selfish aggressiveness!

I enclose various clippings, two of which deal with the interesting question of the inviolability of treaties. The first of these cites an article by John Stuart Mill (which I haven’t yet been able to get hold of), to the effect that few, if any, treaties can be absolutely permanent because of the necessarily changing circumstances of the nations which enter into them; and that every nation must reserve the right to alter a treaty to which it is a party if its interests compel it to do so. This theory, which of course is perfectly sound, the author of this letter to the “Outlook” (English) cites to prove that the Germans cannot justly be blamed for violating the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. The fallacy of any such line of argument ought to be evident and is pretty completely exposed by the answers in the “Outlook” (for the following week). A good instance of an outgrown treaty was the Clayton-

Bulwer treaty between ourselves and England in regard to the Panama Canal—but we did not simply violate it without warning and at the expense of all notions of common fairness and decency, as did the Germans in the case of Belgium. On the contrary, we frankly told England that we thought circumstances had altered since the treaty was made, and invited her to negotiate a new one. This led to the Hay-Paunceforte treaty. Later, when we attempted to discriminate in favor of our own coastwise shipping, President Wilson, ignoring our possible technical legal rights and considering rather that the rest of the world agreed with England in her interpretation of the treaty, secured the repeal of this act. His main argument was that the large-minded, generous course of action toward a neighbor nation was the only course compatible with our own national dignity. How very different this was from the theory on which Germany acted!

Another case of a treaty which we “denounced” and terminated was our commercial treaty with Russia, but this contained a specific provision allowing either party to it to “denounce” or refuse to renew it at certain given intervals. We merely took advantage of this provision.

I can conceive of a case where, without any such provision, a nation would be justified in refusing to be bound by treaty. Suppose, to take an extreme case, we had bound ourselves years ago to join Germany, should some opportunity arise in the future, in conquering and partitioning China. When the opportunity came—supposing we had been conscienceless enough not to demand the repeal of the treaty in the meantime and the substitution of some other agreement as “compensation” to Germany—I think we should have had at least an arguable right to refuse to abide by our promise on the ground that moral standards had altered since the treaty was made. It is the

possibility of cases like this, though not so flagrant as this, which justifies the assertion that the obligation of treaties can't be regarded as unconditionally binding, irrespective of any circumstances which may afterwards arise. But even this slight reservation is dangerous, and should be admitted with the greatest reluctance—for, as Lloyd George said, "treaties are the currency of international intercourse," and if that currency becomes debased, civilized intercourse between nations becomes impossible.

In fact, I think that, if the performance of the treaty involves only an injury to the nation called upon for such performance, unless that nation has taken steps to relieve itself of the unwelcome obligation, there can be few conceivable situations in which a refusal to perform such an obligation can be excused. My illustration, above, involved an injury to an innocent third party, and was to that extent a much clearer case. But, in the case of the German violation of the Belgian neutrality, not only was there no such excuse for Germany, but consideration for the rights of the innocent third party was an additional reason for observing—not for violating—the treaty.

Sheringham, October 13th.

Dear E.:

I was interested in what you said as to the vogue of Usher's "Pan-Germanism" at present in America. It is a book which has real value as showing, from the viewpoint of an outsider, himself considerably "Germanized," what modern Germans think of other nations and what is their ambition for their own country's future. It is well that the rest of the western world should learn as vividly as possible just what these opinions and this ambition mean for all of Germany's neighbors! But beyond this Usher's

book is pretty shallow and second-rate. As history it has no real standing—both its facts and conclusions drawn from them are *most unreliable*. Occasionally his imagination and his readable style make his survey of recent European events quite suggestive—but unfortunately one has to discount about half of what he writes.

Bernhardi's book is more important, as being written by a German, and one who had considerable vogue in his own country. Cramb's book, though I don't like his glorification of militarism, is far sounder and more trustworthy than Usher's.

I shall also send you, when I can get a duplicate copy (this is slow work these days), a pamphlet by an Oxford doctor containing a lot of most interesting and illuminating information about the "Pan-German League"—backed up, as Usher's work almost never is, by actual quotations from their propagandist "literature," and information as to their personnel, etc. Some of their writings are really almost unbelievable! How a country like Germany could have permitted such a propaganda to be carried on under semi-official auspices, and with the open support of members of the Government, is almost more than one can understand. A very large proportion, for example, of all the school-teachers, who in Germany are public officials, are active members of the League and spread its poisonous doctrines in their schools. Many of the best-known newspapers are known to be "organs" of the League, and most of the others give a great deal of space to its publications. Its lectures and pamphlets are innumerable, and in every part of the country its propaganda is familiar and readily accepted. Allied organizations, like the Navy League, work with it toward the same general aims in world politics. The writer of this pam-

phlet says that the Government has long been afraid of its power, and has not dared to curb even its worst excesses—and there is a good deal of evidence to support this belief. Unfortunately this writer (C. R. Fletcher) is himself a very prejudiced, intemperate sort of person, and makes a good many assertions which he will find it hard to prove—but these affect very little the trustworthiness of the *actual information* which he has collected, the most striking part of which is his quotation from “Pan-German” pamphlets. The name of his own pamphlet is “The Germans and What They Covet”—wait until you read it. I have read enough in many of the German newspapers myself, especially the “Tägliche Rundschau,” to know that the poison of “Pan-Germanism” is wide-spread and virulent.

Sheringham, October 16th.

Dear K.:

I sent you the other day a new popularly written pamphlet by a man named Cloudesley Brereton—a very readable and, with a few very slight exceptions, fair, well written and enlightened statement of the English case. It seems to me a particularly good book for popular consumption, for though it is popularly written it is not by any means cheap or trashy. The last chapter, indeed, is really fine and contains several thoughtful, valuable suggestions as to the final settlement.

The fall of Antwerp was discouraging from the point of view of the poor, harried, persecuted Belgians, but otherwise it is not thought it will have much effect on the general military situation. Germany cannot use this city as a naval base because the mouth of the Scheldt is wholly in Dutch territory and *any* military use of it would involve

immediate violation of Dutch neutrality. The Dutch, it is certain, will go to war with Germany rather than permit this, and England, who respected Dutch neutrality when it was to her advantage to use the Scheldt to send troops and supplies to Antwerp, will certainly not allow the Germans to violate this neutrality with impunity. Besides, the Germans will have to pass the English fleet to get any ships South to the mouth of the Scheldt. As a base for airship raids, which will probably be attempted, Antwerp is no better than Brussels, and sheds and other equipment for Zeppelins will take a long time to prepare.

An invasion of England from the North Sea is being a good deal talked of, and, if the British fleet could be entirely left out of the calculation, it would undoubtedly be a real danger. Even as it is, the plan may be tried, but the English are not losing much sleep over it. Their preparations have long been made, and it is shrewdly suspected that the recent discussions in the newspapers are intended as much as anything to buck up recruiting. Something over 700,000 men out of the million asked for have already been raised, and probably the whole number could have been secured by this time if the War Office could have handled them fast enough, and provided them with training quarters, equipment, and, most difficult of all, experienced non-commissioned officers. It is in this latter direction that the greatest difficulty will be felt, but England has a large supply of retired soldiers, veterans of past wars, who will be available. In order to stem the rush of recruits a few weeks ago the War Office raised the height requirement to 5 feet 6 inches, but recently it has reduced it to 5 feet 5 inches. Originally it was 5 feet 3 inches, and before long it will probably be put back at this figure. The rate of enlistment will then be considerably accelerated.

Sheringham, October 20th.

Dear K.:

I have been reading lately a very able study of the whole case as between Germany and England—Sarolea's "Anglo-German Problem." It is thoroughly readable and so good that I have sent you two copies. The author is a Belgian by birth, cosmopolitan by education, now a professor at the University of Edinburgh, Belgian consul in Edinburgh, editor of "Everyman," and a thoughtful, well-informed, broad-minded Liberal. A better combination for a study of Anglo-German relations would be hard to find, and the book was written nearly two years ago, before the present war was thought of. You may think, as you read the introduction, that he is too hard on the Germans, but he is quite ready to admit their good points, and he does seem to me to prove his case.

I shall send you shortly a pamphlet by Sir E. Cook called "How Britain Strove for Peace," a careful review of the English efforts to come to a friendly agreement with Germany during the last fifteen years. I haven't yet read it, but I imagine it will cover just the ground that I have been wanting to see covered fully. Sarolea takes up this same question and is strongly of the opinion that Germany's grievance is almost entirely groundless. His book is any amount more able and reliable than Usher's and much more satisfactory than Cramb's.

*Georgian House, London, England,
October 23rd.*

Dear K.:

In some ways I hated to leave Sheringham, as I enjoyed all of the last two weeks there, but it is interesting to get back again nearer the centre of things, and I shall be glad

to see my friends. I expect to go to the H.'s for a few days next week, and for Sunday, November 1st, to the B.'s at Oxford. W. C. has gone to France with his car for Red Cross work. The D.'s are also here, though the war has almost put a stop to the new business that J. D. was trying to build up.

*Georgian House, London, England,
October 31st.*

Dear K.:

I went down to Weybridge on Tuesday and stayed there with the H.'s until last night. I was so glad to see them again. Mrs. H. is helping run a house for twenty Belgian refugees and she took me over to see them. A Louvain professor—a nice, quiet, intelligent man—is in charge there for the Committee, and I talked a little halting French with him and some of the other men. They are mostly elderly tradespeople from the southeastern French-speaking portion of Belgium, and they are pitifully destitute. They are not by any means saints—they quarrel among themselves, poor things, as any average families would, being dumped down together indiscriminately in strange surroundings, and with no regular work to keep their minds employed; but the Committee has sent some of them to other places and substituted more congenial people and gradually the situation is being smoothed out. Naturally, they were all very bitter against the Germans. . . .

I have a tremendous confession to make! I tried to enlist to-day, and was turned down. I have n't written you about this before, although I have been more and more determined to try it, as soon as I could get "fit." I wanted to see first whether it would be possible, and not to get you stirred up unnecessarily! I tried the "Sportsmen's Battal-

ion" to-day, and was told that no one who wasn't an English subject could take the oath of allegiance to King George. Naturally, I couldn't give up my American citizenship, even temporarily. . . .

I shall probably try for some Red Cross work, or something of this sort. I *do* want to be doing something to help. . . .

All the news is splendid these days. I am glad Turkey is in the game at last, as it will give a chance to remove a plague-spot at the end of the war. The Allies have been more than patient and generous with her for months past—but *quem Deus vult perdere* . . .

The German offensive has pretty well broken down in all quarters—Germany's bolt, I believe, is shot. She will hang on, though, for a long while yet. . . .

*Georgian House, London,
November 3rd.*

Dear K.:

You may be surprised to see "Georgian House" at the head of this letter instead of Hindhead, where I told you I would be. I was there until this morning, but last night I got a telegram from Mrs. J. which brought me back by an early train. I had written her about trying to enlist, and told her that I wanted to get some Red Cross work to do. She wired that Captain W., son of the Lady W. that I wrote you about, was going to France to-day with the Australian Volunteer Hospital, and would like to have me go with him, if it could be arranged. I got him on the telephone from Hindhead, and arranged to meet him here this morning.

I met Lady W. and the whole family, come to see him off, and had a talk with him. He said he would like to

have me with him on his car, if the Hospital would send me, and gave me a letter to them. I went there and talked with them, and found that only the driver was sent with each car—there being really nothing for any one else to do between the front (where orderlies put the wounded men on the cars) and the hospital at Boulogne (where the doctors take charge of them). All the space in each car is needed for the wounded. They said, however, that if I would learn to drive a car, they could put me in charge of one in a week or two, and I could then join Captain W. at Boulogne.

I told them that I would do this, and am to begin lessons at the Motor Schools, Ltd., to-morrow morning. I shall also take French lessons at a Berlitz school. . . . I wonder if, when you read all this at first, you will think I am entirely crazy? I 'm *not*! I have felt more like myself since getting back to something definite and worth while, than for months past. This work will be out-of-doors, and ought to be entirely possible for me now, as my last weeks at Sheringham have left me quite fit again.

Captain W. is a rare person, one with whom I shall be immensely glad to work. . . . He was very friendly about wanting me to go with him, and it really seems an unusually good chance. If for any reason this plan falls through, I shall try for one of the other field hospitals.

To-night I dine with the J.'s, to-morrow night with E. P. My days, I imagine, will be fairly full with motor-car lessons and French—but it is a pleasure to feel fit for something again. . . . I have been coming more and more to feel that I *must* have a hand in this war in some capacity—and this Red Cross work, I believe, I *can* do now. So do say you approve! It will be at least two weeks before I can get away, in any case, so there will be

plenty of time to write you more about my plans. I will, of course, leave my address with the F. L. & T. Co., though letters will then, I fear, be a bit delayed. I shall have a good deal to write you about, if I get there!

*Georgian House, London,
November 4th.*

Dear K.:

I am starting in with my motor and French lessons, and am very keen to learn to drive as soon as possible so they can send me out with a car. It will be painful work, but useful and important. The British troops are showing up magnificently—in the hospitals, as well as on the field—but Mrs. J. tells me that the incessant strain of fighting against superior numbers, as well as the noise, and the physical and nervous fatigue, has actually driven a number of otherwise uninjured men temporarily insane. War *is* horrible,—and I shall soon know it, I imagine, only too well—but I *shall* be glad to be helping. . . . I am going to buy some of my kit to-day—water-proof khaki clothes, sleeping-bag, pistol, etc. If I can only keep feeling as well as I am now I sha'n't have any trouble, and I really believe the out-door work will do the business. I am sure you wouldn't want me to give up the thing I feel best fitted for now and believe I am well enough to do, just because of *some* risk of my insides going wrong again!

I had a nice evening with the J.'s yesterday. They look tired and worn out, but were so friendly and cheerful. . . .

HERE the letters were ended by his death. What the further development of his opinions would have been can only be conjectured. But knowing his temperament and the

way in which his political convictions were arrived at, one is warranted in believing that he would not have narrowed into partisanship, but would have been increasingly concerned with the permanent and international aspects of the war.

His strong sympathy was with England and the Allies; he would have been glad to fight on their side. But this was due to his belief in the principles which he felt were bound up with their cause; and after the war, in the reconstruction which must follow in all parts of the world, he would surely have found some place among the workers for a new and finer civilization.

IN MEMORIAM

Arthur Crosby Ludington

1880-1914

THE friends of Arthur C. Ludington, whose names are signed below, had intimate opportunity to know the work which he did for this City and State.

To the solution of civic problems in New York he contributed a keen intelligence, trained in political science at Yale, at Heidelberg, and as assistant to President Wilson at Princeton. Having an income sufficient for his daily needs, he chose to devote his whole energy to public service. His patience, skill and reliability in gathering and marshalling facts, and in devising and improving legislation, made him indispensable in many public undertakings. In the struggle for honest elections, direct primaries, Massachusetts ballot, short ballot, legislative reform and many kindred proposals he played a part which was always immensely useful, yet rarely conspicuous.

It is significant that hardly a piece of work is identified with his name or capable of being singled out as exclusively his handiwork. Yet few important movements were undertaken without receiving from him some real contribution. He worked always in such unselfish and intimate co-operation with others that these contributions, large though they were, cannot be detached from those of other men. He rendered important service to the City Club, the Citizens' Union, the Honest Ballot Association, the Direct Primary Association, the Short Ballot Organi-

zation, the legislative committee of the Progressive party, the Congestion Committee, and to Governors, Mayors and members of the Legislature.


His untimely death by accident in London on November 4th deprives this city of a citizen whose later life would surely have been of still greater value and eminence.

We who have suffered a personal loss in his death feel it our duty to bring home to citizens of New York the debt of gratitude which they, too, owe to his memory. And especially should he become an inspiring example to other young men of education and means. Freed from the necessity of earning a living, he felt an imperative call to freely give public service. For he held, with Robert Louis Stevenson, that "no man can be honest who does not work."

Everett V. Abbot
George B. Agnew
Walter T. Arndt
Albert S. Bard
Charles A. Beard
Robert S. Binkerd
Emory R. Buckner
William M. Chadbourne
Richard S. Childs
Julius Henry Cohen
Albert de Roode
Arthur Du Bois
Mansfield Ferry
Edward R. Finch
Felix Frankfurter
Joseph O. Hammitt

Robert L. Hoguet
William H. Hotchkiss
Raymond V. Ingersoll
T. Catesby Jones
Clarence N. Lewis
Sam A. Lewisohn
Walter Lindner
Robert McC. Marsh
Philip J. McCook
Henry Moskowitz
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